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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we investigate the privacy-preserved data publication problems to-
wards pervasively existing linkable social-physical contents. On the one hand, data publica-
tion has been considered as a critical approach to facilitate numerous utilities for individuals,
populations, platform owners, and all third-party service providers. On the other hand, the
unprecedented adoption of mobile devices and the dramatic development of Internet-of-Thing
(IoT) systems have pushed the collection of surrounding physical information among popu-
lations to a totally novel stage. The collected contents can provide a fine-grained access to
both physical and social aspects of the crowds, which introduces a comprehensively linkable
and potentially sensitive information domain. The linkage includes the related index like
privacy, utility, and efficiency for sophisticated applications, the inherent correlations among
multiple data sources or information dimensions, and the connections among individuals.
As the linkage leads to various novel challenges for privacy preservation, there should be a
body of novel mechanisms for linkable social-physical data publications.
As a result, this dissertation proposes a series of mechanisms for privacy-preserved link-
able social-physical data publication. Firstly, we study the publication of physical data where
the co-existing useful social profiles and the sensitive physical profiles of the data should be
carefully maintained. Secondly, we investigate the data publication problem jointly con-
sidering the privacy preservation, data utility, and resource efficiency for task completion
in crowd-sensing systems. Thirdly, we investigate the publication of private contents used
for the recommendation, where contents of a user contribute to the recommendation results
for others. Fourthly, we study the publications of reviews in local business service systems,
where users expect to conceal their frequently visited locations while cooperatively main-
tain the utility of the whole system. Fifthly, we study the acquisition of privacy-preserved
knowledge on cyber-physical social networks, where third-party service providers can de-
rive the community structure without accessing the sensitive social links. We also provide
detailed analysis and discussion for proposed mechanisms, and extensively validate their per-
formance via real-world datasets. Both results demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms
can properly preserve the privacy while maintaining the data utility.
At last, we also propose the future research topics to complete the whole dissertation.
The first topic focuses on the privacy preservation towards correlations beneath multiple data
sources. The second topic studies more privacy issues for the whole population during data
publication, including both the novel threats for related communities, and the disclosure of
trends within crowds.
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Social-Physical Data, IoT, Community, Cooperation, Fairness
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Main Contribution
The past decade witness both the continuously diversification of online social networks
and the impressively developing of sensing and embedding techniques. Nowadays, both sides
contribute volumes of data challenging the capability of current computers. For example, it
is announced that by the year 2020, the data generated by smart building alone will reach
37.2 zetabytes [1], which is only one source of physical data. Experts forecast that cities
around the world will invest a total of about 41 trillion over the next 20 years to convert
themselves into smart cities [2], Meanwhile, these newly emerged systems and applications
also involve an unprecedented huge number of population into their eco-system, both actively
and passively. It is believed more than 3 billion people will join the online social networks
by 2021.
Generally, the generated data should be considered as the social-physical data. The
physical data collected via smart devices are posted to the online social networks for social
utility, like the sharing of fitness data. Meanwhile, the social relationships also play essential
roles in physical domain [3] [4]. For instance, smart home systems will serve all members
in the family, and smart building systems may sense and collect data for users in the same
company. While bringing tremendous benefits, the social-physical data will also bring serious
threatens to the population involved [5]. The underlying reason is that the social-physical
data can provide a fine-grained and comprehensive coverage for every individual, which is
even beyond the awareness of human beings. This fact will definitely attract numerous
attacks on the published social-physical data, which aim at inferring the private information
of the population.
2Actually, one essential feature for the social-physical data is the pervasively existed
linkage among both the data and the involved people [6]. This linkage can be categorized
into three folds:
Firstly, as the data are usually utilized for sophisticated applications, multiple factors
are linkable and should be jointly considered during the data publication. For example, the
data may correlate with some sensitive locations like hospitals or police offices, which should
not be arbitrarily published. Meanwhile, the utility of the data for the application and the
resource consumption for data publication should also be maintained. Generally, individuals
should properly publish their data considering all three factors [7].
Secondly, due to the emergence of systems like smart IoTs, the social-physical data from
different resources are also linkable as they may cover the same individual, or the same event
in the local area. One typical instance is the smart building, where a batch of devices can
record the location of a resident. The collected data can provide fully trace of the resident
even if they are only partially accessible.
Thirdly, the social-physical data related to different people are also linkable due to
the inherent social connections among people. The social-physical data related to people
in the same community usual shares some common knowledge. For example, the location
information with one’s cellphone could be used to infer whether her colleagues are also
off-duty.
The above mentioned linkage brings numerous novel threats on the private information
of both individuals and the population.
For individuals, their sensitive information could be revealed by both the data from
multiple dimensions and the data from their social neighbors. For example, due to the
multiple data sources, their locations could be exposed even if they have perfect access
control on cellphones. In another case, one’s activity may be revealed by her friends who
publish the sensitive information carelessly. Furthermore, both threats are hard to thwart
due to the limited controllability to the public devices and the heterogeneous behaviors
among friends.
3For the population, the privacy issues also exist in multiple aspects. People may each
hold their own privacy concerns, while sharing common purpose during the data publication,
like supporting the general services of an IoT system. They can also share common sensitive
information, while maintaining their own utility for data publication. For example, the alco-
holic anonymous may be revealed by the linkable fitness data published by group members.
More seriously, all these threats are also hard to defend due to the heterogeneous members.
In this case, the members can be diverse on their data, their concerns on the privacy, will-
ingness to help others, and many other factors. These factors lead to new challenges for
a convincing and proper data publication. Furthermore, even the unrelated people could
be threatened when social-physical data are carelessly published. Terrorists may utilize the
trend of crowds to carry out terrorist attacks, or even misdirect the crowds to dangerous
situations. To preserve the privacy in this category is even more challenging as it is difficult
for unrelated people to cooperate with each other.
Finally, even if the privacy could be preserved by means, the data publication still needs
to consider other factors like utility and efficiency. Otherwise, the published data could be
useless for applications or infeasible due to high overheads.
Unfortunately, these threats and challenges have not been properly handled. Existing
solutions still tend to consider the social-physical data as isolated islands and publish them
independently. To mitigate this gap, we design in this dissertation a comprehensive frame-
work for linkable social-physical data publication. The novel mechanisms could properly
handle the newly emerged challenges for privacy preservation in each category. The main
contribution of each part includes:
In the first part, we investigate the problem of data publication in cyber-physical social
systems. It for the first time jointly considers the social and physical feature of each content,
where the social features will influence the attraction of a user, and the physical features
usually correlate with the sensitive status of a user. As a result, this part proposes a novel
framework for data publication. The framework retains the original social profile for each
user while concealing the sensitive physical profile. Furthermore, the framework is proved to
4strictly preserve the private physical profiles while achieving a maximal social utility. On the
one hand, the framework can obfuscate the observed physical profiles and hide the frequent
physical status. On the other hand, the framework keeps the observed social profile similar
to the original one, and also publish a maximal size of data. The validation on real-world
dataset demonstrates the performance of our framework.
In the second part, we study the problem of content publication in mobile crowd-sensing
systems. In these systems, the participants are assigned a task to collect requested objects
in nearby area. The objects could be captured by contents including videos, images, sounds,
etc. Meanwhile, each content consumes a corresponding battery and bandwidth resource for
uploading, and they are also correlated with some sensitive information like the locations
or other sensitive objects appeared in the contents. Therefore, the data publication should
jointly consider the finish of the task, the resource consumption, and the privacy preservation.
This part first proves the complexity of the problem to be NP-complete, and then proposes a
corresponding heuristic algorithm. The algorithm strictly follows the constraint on privacy,
which limits the divergence between the individual mobility pattern and the average pattern.
Meanwhile, the algorithm also tries to utilize a minimum size of resource to complete the
task. The evaluation results show the effectiveness of the algorithm.
In the third part, we study the problem of data publication for users in cyber-physical
social systems, where the physical data are integrated into the social networks for corre-
sponding applications. In this case, the contents from different users are linkable as they
will contribute to the recommendation results for each other. The published data should be
able to provide qualified recommendation results for all users, while revealing no sensitive
physical status of users. To achieve this goal, a hierarchical algorithm for data publication is
proposed. It preserves the private physical status by avoiding the publish of any set of con-
tents revealing the sensitive information. Meanwhile, the algorithm achieves fairness among
users, and provides qualified service to a maximal number of users. The corresponding anal-
ysis demonstrates the performance of the algorithm, which is also validated via extensive
experiments.
5In the fourth part, we study the problem of data publication for users in local business
service systems, where users publish reviews for local businesses. These reviews are linkable
as they cooperatively maintain the reputations for businesses. However, simply publishing all
reviews will disclose the frequent visited areas of a user, which severely threats the personal
privacy. Therefore, this part proposes a corresponding mechanism cooperatively publishing
reviews from all users. The mechanism can hide the frequent appearance of users in the whole
urban area, while maintain a trustable review lists for local businesses. As the optimization
problem is a NP-complete problem, this part analyzes and demonstrates the efficiency ratio of
the proposed mechanism. Evaluation results reveal the mechanism outperforms the method
where each user local publishes her data.
In the fifth part, we study the problem of community detection in cyber-physical social
systems. In this case, users share their physical contents for social purposes, while some
social links among them are marked as sensitive. Therefore, people inside the system are
linkable as they share the sensitive social connections. The objective of the problem is to
help the third-party service providers derive the accurate community structure, while the
knowledge on sensitive links will not be revealed. As a result, the differential privacy is
utilized to preserve the private links, and a corresponding mechanism is designed to help
third-party service providers acquire useful information to refine the observed community
structure. The mechanism can iteratively select the critical links and request their weights to
improve the results. The analysis proves that the mechanism follows the differential privacy.
Finally, experimental results show the accuracy of the observed community structure can be
improved by our mechanism.
Finally, we also briefly introduce our future work to complete the whole dissertation.
The first part of our future study focuses on the consideration of privacy preservation and
data publication for the linkage among different social-physical data sources. The second
part tries to further investigate the data publication problems considering the privacy and
utility for communities and crowds. This part is designed for the novel challenges caused by
the linkage among the relatively large population.
61.2 Organization
In chapter 2, we review the related works, which mainly include the introduction on
typical privacy preservation metrics, and privacy-preserved data publication mechanisms for
cyber-physical systems, online social networks, and Internet of Things. Chapter 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
are the main body of our dissertation, each including one part of our work. In chapter 8, we
introduce two future directions for our subsequent research. In chapter 9, we conclude our
work.
7Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
The data publication mechanisms help data owners to properly release their data to
other viewers, who will apply the information for knowledge discovery, making decision,
or providing corresponding services. This kind of techniques are pervasively applied in
all categories of information systems including social networks, clouds, IoTs, Bioinformatic
libraries, etc. Therefore, the data publication is generally treated as one of the most essential
component to facilitate the utilization of data science by both academic research or industrial
development. However, as the data often includes private information of the owner, ranging
from sensitive demographic characteristics, social relationships, to physical information like
health status and genetics features, it is critical and challenging to properly and adequately
publish the data to other viewers. There must be a reasonable trade-off between the privacy
preservation and the retaining of data utility for every instance of data publication as the
population nowadays are unprecedentedly concerned on their private information.
As a result, the privacy-preserved data publication has acted as a pivotal topic and
unavoidable challenge for the design of information systems, especially as the continuously
emerging of novel data sources, participants, applications, and scenarios. In this chapter,
we will first go through some general methodologies designed for privacy preservation in
information systems. Then we review existing studies focusing on the privacy-preserved
social-physical data publication. Finally, in section 2.3 and 2.4, We introduce corresponding
solutions for data publication and privacy preservation in physical domain (i.e., Internet of
Things) and social domain (i.e., Online Social Networks), respectively.
82.1 General Methodologies for Privacy-Preserved Data Process
As individual users begin to be aware of and concern on their private information, there
have been a large body of works focusing on the data privacy in all categories of popular
information systems. These works provide solutions for privacy preservation in different
components of these systems, and they mainly differs in the objectives of the preservation.
In this section, we will review two major objectives frequently applied by existing works.
Anonymity : The anonymity techniques aim at sanitizing the published data to thwart
the re-identification attacks from adversaries or malicious viewers. Sweeney [8] proposed the
idea of K-anonymity, where each person cannot be distinguished from at least k-1 individ-
uals contained in the released data. Subsequent works [9] designed different approaches for
data publication guaranteeing K-anonymity in different scenarios. For instance, the work in
[10] proposed algorithms to achieve personalized k-anonymity for different users, the work
in [11] investigated the k-anonymity protection in multidimensional data. Niu et al. pro-
posed an algorithm to generate dummy locations. They considered the side information of
dummy locations exploited by adversaries and evaluated the privacy level in terms of en-
tropy. Palanisamy et al. [12] designed a mix-zone based algorithm to make individuals in the
same area indistinguishable when they leave the area. Wang et al. [13] designed algorithm
to achieve the k-anonymity for location-based queries. Finally, there are also some works
extending the idea of k-anonymity. For example, (α, k)-anonymity [14], L-diversity [15] and
tree indistinguishability [16].
Differential Privacy : The main idea of differential privacy [17] is to ensure that
the adversaries will not learn the information of any single person based on the released
statistical results, even if they have access to others’ information. Existing works mainly
achieved this principle by introducing random noise to the published data or results. Based
on the involved data, Laplace mechanisms and geometry mechanisms are two major methods
to inject the noise [18] [19]. However, as the objective of data publication usually includes
the derivation of some sophisticated knowledge rather than simple statistical results. There
have been many mechanisms designed for the differential private publication of complicated
9data structure. For example, mining of frequent graph pattern under differential privacy was
studied in [20]. Wang et al. [21] considered the publish of degree information of a graph.
Some other work [22] [23] [24] [25] published the graphs for general purposes. Publication
of serial data under differential privacy is studied in [26] and [27]. The work in [28] studied
the recommending system with differential privacy. Finally, there are also some studies
facilitating the implementation of machine learning techniques under differential privacy
[29]. Models like linear regression [30] and Bayesian method [31] are considered.
Another body of works [32] [33] [34] [35] implemented differential privacy for distributed
data source, where each data owner locally holds her contents and uploads it to the curator
with differential privacy. In these work, random response were utilized for noise injection.
They mainly differed in the uploaded data structure, and achieved heterogeneous balance
on data utility, privacy preservation, and resource consumption.
2.2 Privacy Preservation in Social-Physical Systems
Nowadays, people are more willing to post their physical data actively and passively
on the social networks. This trend has brought abundant social utility to the physical
data, ranging from supporting sophisticated services to basic friend recommendation. Un-
fortunately, due to the inherent openness of online social networks, and the lacking in the
knowledge on physical domains, users in social-physical systems may be more vulnerable
than ever and expect specific approaches for privacy preservation. In this section, we review
some remarkable solutions for privacy preservation in social-physical systems. We mainly
classify these works into two categories: the privacy for individuals and for correlated users.
Privacy for Individuals: Data publication for physical data in online social networks
has been extensively studied during the past decades. Not surprisingly, many proposed so-
lutions take privacy issues into consideration. For example, the location information, as
a most common feature for many online social networks, has been properly protected for
users in many works [36] [37] [38] [39]. They mainly differ in the definitions of sensitive
information and the knowledge owned by adversaries. Bilogrevic et al. [40] investigated the
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motivation behind user check-in and the impact of location coarsening. Based on the sub-
jective test, it is concluded that the utility loss caused by coarsening techniques is correlated
with the underlying motivation. Micinski et al. [41] studied the correlation between location
coarsening and application utility on the Android platform. By means of an Android tool
”CloakDroid”, they showed that providing applications with less precise location informa-
tion does not significantly thwart their functionality. The study in [42] assumes adversaries
own the optimal attacking strategy, and proposes some corresponding countermeasures for
content publication. The location obfuscation mechanism investigated in [4] preserved user
profiles on mobile patterns, which is derived from a set of location information.
The faking techniques [43] modify the true location to a similar one, or replace the
whole trace with a synthesized path. The studies in this field mainly differ on the methods
to generate fake information. The work in [44] generates more realistic fake paths by adding
noises to the routes of Google Map, and also use GPS readings as side information. The
work in [45] presents a query-perturbation-based scheme to obfuscate users’ true requests
along paths.
Among these methods for location privacy preservation, partially publishing or sup-
pression is another major methodology in privacy preservation, where only a proportion of
data is published, such as insensitive or insignificant locations. Shokri et al. [46] proposed
a mechanism to randomly publish true locations and fake locations. They formulate the
location publishing problem as a Stackleberg game and derive a privacy-optimal solution.
Some other works consider location privacy based on each individual’s historical data [47].
A Markov chain is trained from historical data, and the locations that are sensitive or es-
sential for inferring the destinations are concealed. The work in [48] predicted a driver’s
destination according to the current path and historical data, and provided suggestions for
location suppression to conceal the destination information. Wang et. al. [49] focused on
the scenario where location data are temporal and spatial correlated, and tried to conceal
the exposure of sensitive information against inference attacks.
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Different privacy, as a most popular measurement for the preservation of sensitive in-
formation, has also been utilized in physical data publication for online social networks [50]
[51] [52]. For example, the work in [53] extended the definition of differential privacy to
geographical locations.
Privacy for Correlated Users : As users are usually physically or socially related, it
is also necessary to jointly preserve their private information. More specifically, it indicates
correlated user may cooperate to further improve the data utility of their obfuscated contents,
and to preserve the privacy must take all related users into consideration. The work in [54]
proposed a mechanism where participants buffer some local information for each other, and
only upload the unique information. This mechanism can decrease the scale of the published
contents for each user to conceal sensitive information. Zheng et al. proposed a framework
[55] where users publish reviews together for local business. It takes the advantage that users
may comment on the same local business. The proposed scheme in [56] utilizes the uploaded
information to generate a private meeting location for a whole community. Furthermore,
applications like mobile crowd-sensing also consider both user correlation and privacy [57]
[58]. They are mainly diverse in the factors involved in the platform. For example, citation
[59] investigated how to utilize the feedbacks from other users to update the incentive, and
citation [60] studied the aggregation tasks together with privacy preservation.
2.3 Data Publication and Privacy Preservation in Internet-of-Things
The collection and publication of physical data has been an important task for the
upcoming Internet-of-Things (IoT). In this section, we briefly introduce some metrics eval-
uating the efficiency of data publication, and review some conclusions for data collection in
mobile crowd-sensing systems, which acts as a major data source for IoTs.
Resource Consumption for Data Publication : A smart IoT system utilizes the
pervasively adopted smart devices as a sensor [61] [62] [63] to collect data and provide
services, ranging from large scale like public event monitoring and power control to fine-
grained scale like path planning for each individual. Considering both the widely adoption
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and the nature of selfishness of participants, it is critical to control energy consumptions
for participants in a smart cyber physical system. There are a series of works studying
the problem of resource consumption for IoTs [64] [65]. Zhao et. al. proposed a novel
sensing mechanism [66] [67] for humans or vehicles utilizing the correlation among sensing
data, hotspots effects, and randomness to facilitate a more energy-efficient coverage for a
monitored area. The work in [68] studied event coverage via sensor networks with multiple
types of sensors, so as to achieve both event coverage and energy saving on sensors. Wang
et. al. studied user activity recognition via the physical data [69]. The proposed method
utilizes a minimum number of sensors to recognize user state while transmitting information
to servers. He et. al. [70] proposed a novel algorithm that jointly consider the resource
consumption and privacy for encryption on mobile devices.
Privacy Preservation for Data Publication : Privacy preservation in IoTs has
been attracting the attention from both academic and industrial communities. This issue
draws even more attention in the recent years due to the pervasively embedded sensors in
mobile devices. Existing techniques like coarsening, faking [39] have all been extended for
data publication in IoTs. Typical studies include exposure of sensitive information [71] [72]
[73], privacy preservation of physical data [74], and usage or access to sensor data [75] [76].
Liu et al. [77] investigated how acceleration sensors in smart phones expose users’ movements
on keyboards. Their result is claimed to be able to recognize the pin number input by ATM
users. Xu et al. [78] proposed an approach based on the virtual reality techniques to bypass
face authentication tests and protect user privacy by avoiding the exposure of their real
faces. There work mainly studies the domain-specific data privacy, while ignoring the utility
in social networks. Zhang et al. [79] studied the privacy-preserved data aggregation for
wireless networks.
Data Publication and Privacy Preservation for Mobile Crowd-sensing : Mo-
bile crowd-sensing, a powerful method for data acquisition in smart IoTs, has also been exten-
sively studied. There is a body of works focusing on data collection for mobile crowd-sensing.
For instance, Xiong et. al. proposed a novel framework [80] on an energy-efficient crowdsens-
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ing platform, which allocates data collection tasks according to the historical behaviors of a
user. Li et. al. studied heterogeneous sensing task assignment [81] which considers the cost
for data collection of each participant. Foremski et. al. proposed a framework [82] where
crowdsensing is used to collect the information about the coverage of cellular networks. The
framework is shown to be energy efficient by limiting the resource consumption on batteries.
Some other works [83] [84] [85] [86] also consider the inner structures for crowdsensing sys-
tems that may improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency. Finally, some works consider
the fairness in mobile crowd-sensing from different aspects, including their correlation with
safety and incentive [87], the fairness on the distance of movement [88], and the correlation
between the fairness and the loyalty [89].
The privacy issue has also been considered in mobile crowd-sensing systems [90] [91]
[92], as participants are vulnerable due to their disclosure of locations and sensory data on
handhold devices. Some of the countermeasures [59] consider the allocation of tasks where
participants would not choose the tasks correlated to their sensitive information, such as
the tasks near a hospital. They mainly differ in the definitions of privacy [93] [57] and
the incentive mechanisms [94] [60] for participants. Location privacy on crowdsourcing is
considered by several works [95] [74] [96]. They allow workers to join crowdsourcing tasks
without revealing their true locations. Finally, differential privacy is also utilized in mobile
crowd-sensing systems to conceal the sensitive information for types of applications [97] [95].
2.4 Data Publication and Privacy Preservation in Online Social Networks
Finally, we take a literature review on the methodologies designed for data publication
in general online social networks. We mainly focus on the privacy preservation on social data,
the fairness among heterogeneous users, and one important application for data publication.
Privacy Preservation for Online Social Networks : For social networks, there
have already been a series of works studying the privacy preservation for content publishing.
The early results mainly focused on anonymization techniques [98] against different types of
attacks. However, all these k-anonymity-based [99] techniques yield to powerful adversaries
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with abundant background knowledge. Minkus et al. [100] investigated how the posted
photos and comments on Facebook and Instagram would expose sensitive information of
children. The work in [38] can infer a user’s undisclosed information from public data
in social networks, and provides some advices on the hiding of undisclosed information.
Heatherly et al. [101] inferred a user’s undisclosed information in Facebook from public data
and designed some corresponding sanitization techniques. Zou et al. [102] designed a data
publication mechanism for dynamic data.
Recent studies preserve privacy for social networks applying differential privacy, which
allows the existence of adversaries with arbitrarily abundant background knowledge. These
approaches can be categorized into two directions.
The first direction focuses on publishing certain types of obfuscated mining results, in-
cluding degree distributions, subgraph counts, frequent graph patterns, cut query, and so
on [103] [104]. Some studies [105] regarded profiles as relational data, and utilize the corre-
sponding techniques like differential privacy [18] to sanitize published data. They generalize,
perturb and release noisy aggregated results for general purposes. The obfuscated results
are theoretically proved to provide the property of differential privacy.
The second direction is to publish a whole social network for general purposes [38]
[106]. The approaches mainly differ in the intermediate structures used for publishing and
the corresponding definitions of differential privacy. Some approaches [22] project a graph
into dK-series, and obfuscate the structure before publishing. Wang et al. [24] proposed a
method that projects a graph into spectral domain, and injects noise to the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors. The work in [107] projected a graph into a randomized hierarchical structure
before releasing.
Fairness in Online Social Networks: Fairness among users is considered from sev-
eral aspects. Han et al. studied the influence maximization problem in OSNs by considering
both the total size of coverage and the coverage for different types of users [108] [109] [110],
including the consideration on the time delay [111], the dynamic OSNs, and the unique seed
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users. The fairness is also considered in device-to-device communications [112] [113], and
some crowdsourcing or spatial crowdsourcing systems [87] [88] [89].
Community Detection in Online Social Networks: Finally, community detec-
tion has been pervasively studied during the past decades. Considering the diverse definitions
for community [114], the current solutions are mainly categorized according to the follow-
ing domains: determining community structure based on social links alone or the contents
published by each user as well, allowing community overlap or not.
For the methods only considering social links [115], the existing works try to improve
the scalability of a community detection algorithm [116]. Peng et al. [117] proposed a
fast community detection algorithm which first discovers the k-core in a graph, and then
labels each remaining node to some of the subgraph. Yang et al. [118] utilized edge density
to decompose a network into any combination of overlapping or hierarchically organized
communities. In another work, Aicher et al. [119] formulated a social network as a weighted
graph, and extended the stochastic block model [120] to model the underlying community
structure.
Some other works consider social links as well as the contents in a social network.
The single dimensional contents including age, gender, race, religion, language, politics are
considered in [121], while the approach in [122] considered information networks and content
sharing networks, and the label on each item is treated as the published content. In their
work, an algorithm running in linear time is proposed, which is able to process networks
an order of magnitude larger than the existing approaches. Zhang et al. [123] proposed
a community detection mechanism that allows a third-party server to learn the impact of
different features. Community structure can also be utilized to infer user behaviors, including
mobility patterns [124], or even some sensitive information [125] [126].
2.5 Summary
Generally, the privacy-preserved data publication has been extensively studied in all
categories of systems. It has been treated as an indispensable component for data process.
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Numerous techniques have been designed to thwart the attacks on private information in
various scenarios. These techniques include the data perturbation, faking data generation,
encryption, mechanisms for data access, etc. However, most of these works limit the data
publication as an independent and isolated problem, especially for the physical data. The
proposed methods only considered few domains of the data, and fit only limited scenarios by
overlooking many important facts. The widely existed linkage on physical data, including
the linkage on different data sources, the linkage on multiple information domains, and the
linkage among users, has not been thoroughly considered for the privacy preservation in data
publication. Therefore, the research in this dissertation is meaningful, essential, and critical.
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Chapter 3
PHYSICAL DATA PUBLICATION WITH JOINT SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL
PROFILES
3.1 Motivation
Cyber-Physical Social Systems (CPSSs) [127], as a new extension of social networks,
is changing our life according to the recent studies [128] [129]. Users update their physical
data collected through pervasive sensors in their mobile devices. They even act as ”sen-
sors” themselves by taking photos or making comments. In such systems, the users are
the creators and builders. They participate in both the computation and formation of the
system [130]. On the other hand, users establish their profiles as they do in a regular so-
cial network by publishing their sensed data. They form their own reputations and achieve
a self-actualization. An typical CPSS is the Local Business Service System (LBSS) [131],
where users initially visit some Point of Interests (PoIs) in their cities and upload photos
and comments like ”intellectual sensors”. Others who are in favor of these comments would
praise or follow them. Unfortunately, while enhancing the functionality of existing Cyber
Physical Systems [132], the CPSS also brings privacy threats to users, since the generated
data usually reveal some private information such as locations, motions, and personal habits.
The users could suffer physical threats, which are far more harmful than advertisements or
spam mails. Therefore, the users face severe challenges when sharing their data in CPSSs.
As a solution, this chapter studies the privacy preserved data publishing problem in CPSSs.
The privacy issues in CPSSs are actually different from the ones in regular social net-
works or the ones towards physical data. Most previous works focusing on data privacy
issues only preserve privacy for single or several records. Take the privacy preservation for
geographical locations as an example [133]. The corresponding problems are well-studied
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ranging from hiding sensitive locations to avoiding inferring locations from public records.
The typical techniques include true location obfuscation, anonymity, etc.
However, these countermeasures are incapable for CPSSs since users often contribute
long-term behaviors [134] and expect their whole physical profiles or patterns to be privacy
preserved. More specifically, as in a social network, users establish their profiles via long-
term participation. They publish and share numerous records revealing their general physical
profiles such as mobility pattern in daily life. The physical profiles are closely related to their
behaviors in the physical world. For example, the mobility pattern refers to a user’s moving
regularity, like appearance possibility in an urban area, visit of abnormal POIs and many
more. Adversaries can crawl the published records from the systems and infer the profile
to obtain the private information such as working and residential areas, abnormal visiting
behaviors, or even potential changes in one’s life. Such information may be further used
for advertisement delivery or even physical stalking. According to the study on a real-case
dataset [4], users with only a moderate number of published records already reveal some
features of their mobility patterns. Therefore, there must be a well-designed tool to help
users regulate their publishing behaviors in CPSSs.
Meanwhile, CPSS users expect to establish and maintain their social profiles while
participating in the computation and formation of the cyber-physical systems [135]. For
example, in an LBSS like Yelp or Facebook, while users voluntarily build up the reputation
system for PoIs, they also expect to attract more followers and receive more supports [136].
Their social profiles can determine how they look like in social networks. Therefore, they
show their activeness, taste, or even life styles through their published records including
ratings, comments, photos, and the inherent features of the PoIs. Due to the fact that the
social profile can be also derived from the published records, the privacy preserved tool must
also take the utility in social networks into consideration. For privacy preservation in social
networks, the existing works mainly focus on hiding both the sensitive communities and the
sensitive information in them [137]. Some works also consider the sensitive information for a
single user [138], like privacy preservation on sensitive attributes, which are not designed for
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physical data. Given the challenges and drawbacks on both sides, the privacy preservation
problem in publishing records and profiles in CPSSs remains unsolved.
To mitigate this gap, we propose a novel framework to handle the record publishing
problem in CPSSs considering both privacy and social utility of users. More specifically, the
proposed framework can
1) preserve physical profiles by carefully selecting the public records;
2) retain utility for individuals within the social networks;
3) support a user-friendly control so that users can adjust their preference and sensitivity
on privacy.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work regarding record publishing in
CPSSs considering both the privacy on physical profiles and utility on social profiles. More
specifically, the privacy preservation mechanism on physical profiles mainly aims to perturb
the adversary’s knowledge on users’ physical status. It perturbs the probability of a user
staying in each status in the physical profile, and reduces the confidence in the frequently
appeared status. For the utility in social networks, our mechanism maintains the consistency
with the original social profile and publishes a maximum number of records. It guarantees
that users can attract the same type of followers and show their activeness. We formulate this
problem as an integer non-linear programming problem and propose a heuristic algorithm.
We prove this algorithm can achieve a local maximized result towards published records while
following both privacy and utility constraints. The experiments on real data sets reveal that
our framework outperforms the existing works, and are comparable to the optimal results.
Following are our main contributions:
• We propose novel definitions on the utility on social profiles and privacy on physical
profiles for CPSSs, which are more reasonable for real world scenarios.
• We formulate the record publishing problem in CPSSs and propose a heuristic algo-
rithm to select the published records.
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• We analyze and prove that the heuristic algorithm can satisfy all the constraints while
publishing a maximal number of records for each user.
• We also propose an adaptive algorithm to support the publishing of novel records.
• We extensively evaluate the performance of our framework towards the real-world
dataset.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follow. The problem of record publishing
in CPSSs is formulated in Section 2. An instance is shown in Section 3. In Section 4,
we propose the heuristic algorithm and the corresponding adaptive algorithm. Section 5
introduces some challenges in real world scenarios. The experiment results are presented in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Problem Formulation
3.2.1 System Model
Assume there are M users, denoted as {w1, w2, · · · , wM}, in an LBSS. For each user wq,
Rqi refers to the ith record, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Kq} and Kq is the number of the records
submitted by wq. Since we assume users are independent, subscript q is omitted in most
of our notations for simplicity and only used when necessary. Each record Ri is a user-
performed event represented by {Ti, PHi, UTi}. Ti is the submission date of the record. We
assume that the submission time of a record is close to the happening time of the event. PHi
is the physical status of the event, such as location, temperature, sensor reading, etc. We
assume the granularity of status is determined by users. Users who are more sensitive about
physical status can select a fine-grained granularity to have more status values denoted as
{p1, p2, · · · , pL}. Each PHi takes a value in {p1, p2, · · · , pL}, and different PHis can have the
same value. UTi is the social status of an event. For example, it can be the features of some
PoIs or the judgement given by the users. The values of social status are {u1, u2, · · · , uC}.
Take the LBSS as a instance, the physical status refers to the set of location a user once
visited, while the social status is a set including categories of these visited PoIs.
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The physical profile of a user w, denoted as P = {P1, P2, · · · , PL} is the set of proba-
bilities w stays in each physical status, which is derived as follows
Pi =
|{Rj | ∀j ≤ Kq, PHj = pi}|
Kq
. (3.1)
The social profile of a user w, denoted as U = {U1, U2, · · · , UC} is the set of numbers of
times w is in each social status, which is derived as follows
Ui = |{Rj | ∀j ≤ Kq, UTj = ui}|. (3.2)
For simplicity, we assume that the social profile of a user is sorted in descending order.
Therefore, the same entry of different users may refer to different social status.
3.2.2 Privacy Model and Utility Model
In our framework, the adversaries are assumed to be honest-but-curious. They do not
attack CPSS servers but simply collect all the published information in the system. With the
knowledge regarding published records, adversaries can infer the physical profiles of users.
Actually, an inferred profile is still biased from the ground truth even when all the published
records are known. However, we believe it is a proper approximation, especially for the users
with many records in the system. The inferred profiles are used for further attacks.
Initially, an adversary can infer the general physical profiles when all the records are
published. In this case, users are terribly vulnerable to attacks. As a consequence, users
only publish a part of the records to thwart the adversaries from obtaining accurate physical
profiles. Such a step is performed by either the users themselves or the service provider of
the CPSS. The privacy on physical profiles can be defined by two constraints: Divergence
and Dissimilarity.
Divergence quantifies threat as the numerical difference between the observed profile
and the general profile. The privacy on physical profile is at risk when the two profiles are
numerically similar to each other. There are many measurements for the statistical distance
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between two distributions. In this chapter, we utilize the total variation distance as
our measurement. However, other metrics like KL-divergence also work for our framework.
Assume Ii is the binary indicator where Ii = 1 meansRi is public, otherwise not. Then we can
define the obfuscated physical profile observed by the adversaries as P ′ = {P ′1, P ′2, · · · , P ′L},
where
P ′i =
|{Rj | j ≤ Kq, PHj = pi, Ij = 1}|
|{Rj | j ≤ kq, Ij = 1}| . (3.3)
Obviously, we have
∑L
j=1 p
′
j = 1, ∀q ≤M . Then the total variation distance is calculated as
follows.
Definition 1. Denote P = {P1, P2, · · · , PL} as a general physical profile derived from all the
records, and P ′ = {P ′1, P ′2, · · · , P ′L} as the observed physical profile on the published records.
Then the total variation distance (distance for short) between P and P ′ is
∆(P, P ′) =
1
2
||P − P ′||1 = 1
2
L∑
i=1
|Pi − P ′i |, (3.4)
where || · ||1 is the 1-norm distance. To guarantee physical profile privacy, the total
variation distance must be larger than a threshold δ. δ is also called the divergence constraint.
It can either be determined by the service provider based on their analysis or set by users
themselves.
Dissimilarity is designed for the threats towards the contour of the physical profile.
Adversaries are also interested in the information revealed by pattern contour, especially
the status with high Pi values. They generally refer to frequently appeared status, which
may be representative symbols for a user. Then with the constraint on dissimilarity, user wq
should publish fewer records whose physical status has a large value in physical profile P .
We define the dissimilarity constraint as follows.
For any physical status pi in P whose value Pi is larger than
1
Lq
, where Lq is the number
of status with non-zero value in P , we must guarantee that the number of published records
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with physical status Pi follows
K ′qi ≤
Kqi∑
Kqj
· (
∑
Kqj − δKq)(Kq −
∑
Kqj)
(1 + δ)Kq −
∑
Kqj
, (3.5)
where K ′qi and Kqi refer to the numbers of published and total records with status pi, and∑
Kqj refers to the total number of records whose Pj values are larger than
1
Lq
.
In Equation (5),
(
∑
Kqj−δKq)(Kq−
∑
Kqj)
(1+δ)Kq−
∑
Kqj
is the largest number of published records with
Pi ≥ 1Lq . The number can be achieved by deriving x from
∑
Kqj
Kq
− x
x+Kq−
∑
Kqj
≥ δ. Equation
(5) can constraint the number of published records for those high ratio physical status and
reduce their ratios in the observed physical profile.
While preserving physical profiles against adversaries, users also expect to retain their
utility within the published records. Specifically, they want to keep their observed social
profiles similar to their general social profiles. It helps them attract and keep followers
with the same interests. Notice that a dissimilar observed social profile may also attract
some followers, but they will probably unfollow the user since the subsequent new records
still contribute to the general social profile, not the observed one. For example, in Yelp,
a user who is a fan of Korean food may not keep followers who are fans of pubs and bars.
Generally, we can conclude the constraints on social profiles with two principles: Consistency
and Maximization.
Consistency means the order of social status in the observed social profile follows the
same order as in the general profile. Assume U ′ = {u′1, u′2, · · · , u′C} is the observed social
profile. Then we have u′i ≥ u′j when ui ≥ uj for all i’s and j’s, which means frequently
appeared social status must also appear in the observed profile.
Maximization requires a maximum number of records to be published while following
the consistency principle. This is also essential since the number of published records reflects
the liveness of a user. Usually, users with many records are more attractive since they are
more likely to publish novel records.
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Table 3.1. List of Notation
Notation Explanation
{w1, w2, · · · , wM} Set of users
Kq Number of records generated by wq
Rq1, Rq2, · · · , RqKq Set of records generated by wq
Ti Submission time for record Ri
PHi Physical status for record Ri
UTi Social status for record Ri
L Total number of physical status
{p1, p2, · · · , pL} Value set for physical status
C Total number of social status
{u1, u2, · · · , uC} Value set for social status
P = {P1, P2, · · · , PL} Physical profile
U = {U1, U2, · · · , UC} Social profile
Lq Number of physical status with non-
zero value in P
Kqi Number of records whose physical
status are pi
Ii Indicator for the publishing of Ri
δ The constraint on divergence
3.2.3 Design Object
The design object of this work is to maximize the number of published records for each
user, while following the divergence and dissimilarity constraints and consistency principle.
As a whole, we can generalize the privacy constraints and utility principles together and
formulate our problem as follows. Assume Γ =
KqmδK2q∑
Kqj((1+δ)Kq−
∑
Kqj)
. For each user uq,
max
Kq∑
i=1
Ii (3.6)
s.t.
1
2
||P − P ′||1 ≥ δ (3.7)
Kqm −K ′qm > Γ ∀pm, pm ≥
1
Lq
(3.8)
U ′m > U
′
n ∀U ′m, Um, Un, U ′n, Um > Un, (3.9)
where constraints (3.7) (3.8) (3.9) indicate divergence, dissimilarity, and consistency respec-
tively.
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3.3 Local Business Service System: An example CPSS
In this section, we introduce an LBSS, which is a typical example of CPSS. This type of
systems has a close connection with the physical world, i.e., gathering information for PoIs,
while also maintains an underlying social network where users may interact with each others.
Both the terms and definitions proposed in Section 3 are explained for this real-world case.
In a typical LBSS, like Yelp or TripAdvisor, users act as sensors. They voluntarily visit local
businesses in their residential areas, write comments, take photos, and upload information to
the system. Meanwhile, users expect to attract more followers as in a general social network.
Some LBSS service providers mark the outstanding users as elite users to praise their efforts.
In such a system, users refer to the users in the system, especially the active ones who
frequently update their information. Records correspond to the reviews uploaded by the
users. Each review is usually a set of photos and comments regarding a local business.
Physical status refers to the user’s visit to the local business, which is tied with the location
of the business. Therefore, one can draw a map for the visited locations by collecting a
user’s reviews. Based on this knowledge, one can further derive a pattern for the probability
that a user appears in each subregion of the urban area. It refers to the physical profile
in our formulation. Such a pattern could be sensitive since it significantly exposes user’s
physical information. The working, residential, and entertaining areas can be potentially
derived from this pattern when an attacker also considers side information like visiting time.
Furthermore, the information can be used to infer private information such as home address,
income, and health status. Both the divergence and dissimilarity constraints are designed to
obfuscate the published pattern from the ground truth. The divergence mainly focuses on
the whole pattern, while the dissimilarity is designed to hide the frequently visited areas.
Users get support on their reviews and try to attract more followers. The social status of
a record refers to the features of the reviews. It could be either the category of the business,
or the key words in a comment. Users build their own social profiles based on their reviews.
It can reflect information like restaurant preference, which attracts other viewers with similar
interests. The consistency and maximum principles can contribute to user’s authority and
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liveness in the social network. Consistency guarantees that a user has a sufficient support
on her most frequently visited category of business, while the maximum principle makes a
user to be an active review creator.
3.4 One Time Review Publishing Algorithm
In this section, we introduce the algorithm for publishing static records, also known
as one time record publication. The one time data publishing mechanism is used by many
service providers like Netflix, Yelp, etc. The published data are usually used for commer-
cial purposes and academic study. However, such publications potentially suffer the de-
anonymization attacks [139]. Then it is also critical to preserve users’ privacy in this case.
As the problem to find a maximum number of published records is formulated as an integer
non-linear programming problem, we design a heuristic algorithm to publish the records and
prove that the algorithm can publish a maximum number of records for each user.
3.4.1 Divided One-Step Maximum Record Publishing Algorithm
Our proposed algorithm is called the Divided One-Step Maximum (DOSM) algo-
rithm. Generally, DOSM divides the whole records set into two disjoint groups, strictly
maintains the privacy constraints and the consistency principle, and publishes the records
with the most contribution during each selection.
More specifically, DOSM divides all the records into two groups according to their
physical status, the upper group UP = {up1, up2, · · · , upLqu} and lower group LP =
{lp1, lp2, · · · , lpLql}, where Lqu +Lql = Lq. The upper group UP includes the records whose
physical status has a support Pi ≥ 1Lq . The lower group includes all the remaining ones.
Within UP and LP , all the records are further grouped by their physical status, i.e., upis
and lpis. More specifically, the UP refers to the set of status a user stays in more frequently,
while LP refers to the less frequently appeared physical status.
For the records in LP , we expect the ratios of the included physical status to increase
in the observed physical profiles, which contributes to the divergence constraint. As a result,
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DOSM tries to publish a maximum number of records from LP under all the constraints
and principle. However, according to the definition of divergence, some physical status
in LP may also request a decreasing in the observed physical profile when δ is extremely
large. Fortunately, the divergence constraint δ is usually in a reasonable range, since it
significantly limits the number of published records when δ is too large. For the records in
UP , DOSM only publishes a part of them to obfuscate the observed physical profile from the
general one. Meanwhile, it follows the consistency principle when choosing records. Based
on these intuitions, DOSM has two primary phases: Baseline Publishing in LP and Bounded
Publishing in UP .
Phase I: Baseline Publishing.
The objective of baseline publishing is to publish a maximum number of records from
LP . During this phase, DOSM mainly maintains the records in two steps.
In the first step, DOSM sets published for all the records in LP . Then it checks the
current order of social status in the observed social profile. This phase ends when it follows
the same order of the general profile. Otherwise, DOSM firstly sorts the social status in the
same order with the general profile, and scans from the first status to the last one. For every
consecutive status pair Ui’ and Ui+1’, it removes the minimum number of records from Ui+1’
so that U ′i+1 < U
′
i .
In the second step, DOSM publishes the records temporarily removed in the first step.
As we see, after step 1, the published records follow the consistency principle, and publishing
any other record in LP violates this principle. Therefore, DOSM turns to the records in UP
for help. For instance, there is a record with social status Ui’ removed in step 1. DOSM looks
for another record with status Ui−1’ in UP . It checks whether the divergence and dissimilarity
constraints are violated after publishing both records. If not, DOSM set published to both
records. DOSM iteratively looks for the records to publish until there is no record left in LP
or no feasible record can be selected in UP . Furthermore, DOSM introduces the following
two rules when selecting records in each round.
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i) One-Step Maximum Strategy : This step publishes records from UP that can lead
to a maximum number of publication in the LP . When there are multiple feasible records
in UP , DOSM selects the record which can lead to the maximum number of records to be
published in LP . More specifically, assume there are a series of records with consecutive
social status U ′i , U
′
i+1, · · · , U ′i+o removed from LP in step 1. Then DOSM picks the record
in UP with social status U ′i−1 that corresponds to the largest o in LP .
ii) Rotation : This step handles the potential violation of the dissimilarity constraint
caused by the selected record in previous step. When publishing record Rj in UP with social
status U ′i−1 violates the dissimilarity constraint, DOSM checks other published records in
UP which have identical physical status with Rj. Assume the achieved record is Rj’. Then
DOSM looks for the records with other physical status but sharing the same social status
with Rj’. Publishing this record does not violate the dissimilarity and divergence constraints.
Assume the achieved record is Rj”. Then DOSM sets published for records Rj, Rj”, and the
corresponding records in LP , and removes Rj’.
This step terminates when there are no records left or no more records can be published
in LP . Then DOSM checks whether the published records follow the divergence constraint.
It terminates if the answer is no, and announces that constraint δ is too tight. After the
second step, DOSM publishes all the records being set published in the first phase, and
proceeds to the second phase.
Phase II: Bounded Publishing
The second phase publishes the remaining records according to the result in the first
phase. It mainly includes three steps, and sets published to a maximum number of records
in each step.
In the first step, DOSM sets published to all remaining records in UP , checks the
consistency principle, and removes the records in UP when necessary. Again, it first sorts
the observed social profiles the same with the general social profile, and checks in a top-down
manner. Each time when DOSM removes a record, it preferentially selects the record with
a physical status in UP that currently violates the dissimilarity constraint.
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In the second step, DOSM continues removing records from UP . As we see, the pub-
lished records follow the consistency principle after step 1. However, the achieving of two
constraints on privacy is unknown. In this step, DOSM checks the number of records being
set published in each sub-group in UP .
It skips the groups which follow the dissimilarity constraint. For the other groups, it
sorts the records according to their social profiles in the same order with the general profile.
Then it removes records in a bottom-up manner, i.e., from the last to the first status, until it
no longer violates the dissimilarity constraint. Meanwhile, DOSM maintains the consistency
principle. Assume that record Rj with social status Ui’ in upk should be removed. However,
removing Rj results in U
′
i < U
′
i+1, and there are no more records in upk with social status
Ui+1’. In this case, DOSM checks other groups in upk until it finds the corresponding records.
Then DOSM removes both records and continues.
After checking each group in UP , DOSM validates the observed physical profile. The
algorithm proceeds to the next step when it follows the divergence constraint. Otherwise,
it iteratively removes records in UP from the last social status to the first one until the
divergence constraint is achieved.
In the last step, DOSM re-considers the removed records in the second step. The
underlying reason is that records in some sub-group are over-removed due to the consistency
principle. In step 2, a part of UP already achieves the dissimilarity constraint, but removing
records in the remaining part may violate the consistency principle. In this case, DOSM may
remove some extra records in the first part. The objective of the last step is to compensate
for them so as to set published for more records.
More specifically, DOSM considers records in a top-down manner according to the
descending order of their social status. We call it One-profile-stage Maximum Strategy.
Within each social status Ui, DOSM checks each sub-group upk in UP :
i) When upk does not have records with status Ui, it does nothing;
ii) When upk has records with social status Ui and setting published to them does not
violate the two constraints and the consistency principle, set all these records or a maximum
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number of records to be published, where the maximum number refers to the minimum
number of records violating any one of the constraints and principle.
iii) When upk has records with social status Ui, but setting them published violates
the dissimilarity constraint, DOSM checks whether upk includes records with social status
Ui−1, Ui−2, · · · , U1. The algorithm replaces the records in status Ui with others in the previous
status, until there are no records with status Ui, or the replacement violates the consistency
principle.
After the third step, DOSM publishes all the records being set published in the second
phase, and the algorithm terminates.
3.4.2 Performance Analysis
The core idea of DOSM is to make a greedy choice in each selection. For instance, in
the second step of baseline publishing, it always selects the records from UP that can lead to
the maximum number of new publishing in LP . The same idea also exists in the third step
of bounded publishing, where DOSM always maximizes the number of published records in
each social profile.
Now we analyze the performance of DOSM. First of all, DOSM follows the divergence
and dissimilarity constraints, and the consistency principle. This can be derived from our
algorithm. After phase 1, DOSM publishes no records in the worst case when all the records
with first social status appearing in UP . However, this result still follows the constraints
even though it is meaningless. In phase 2, DOSM always follows the constraints and principle
after step 1 and step 2, and step 3 also strictly follows them. Then after phase 2, DOSM can
at least achieve the same set of published records with phase 1. As a consequence, DOSM
always follows the divergence and dissimilarity constraints, and the consistency principle.
Next, we prove that after the execution of DOSM, no more records can be published
from both UP and LP . It means DOSM achieves a local maximum performance.
We start with the analysis on LP , which is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. After the baseline publishing of DOSM, no more records can be published in LP .
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Proof. First of all, step 1 of baseline publishing obviously removes the minimum number of
records. Assume LP ’ is the set of published records in LP . Then when
i) |LP ′| = |LP |, the conclusion is true.
ii) |LP ′| < |LP |, according to the process of baseline publishing, it indicates publishing
extra records from LP violates the consistency principle or the divergence constraint. Fur-
thermore, the dissimilarity constraint is unavoidable since DOSM introduces the rotation
mechanism in the first phase.
As a whole, we conclude that in both cases, there are no more feasible records in LP
after the execution of DOSM. The proof is finished.
For the second step, we prove that DOSM can also publish a local maximum number
of records from UP . It can be concluded from the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In the third step in the bounded publishing phase, DOSM can newly publish a
maximum number of records.
Proof. In this lemma, the newly published records refer to those removed in step 1 and step
2 in the bounded publishing phase, and re-published in step 3. We prove this by reduction.
During the first iteration of step 3, DOSM sets published for the records in the first social
status. The number of published records is maximum when all the records are published.
Otherwise, assume that upk has a record with social status U1 left.
1) When publishing it violates the dissimilarity constraint, we can no longer publish
any record in this group.
2) When publishing it violates the divergence constraint, we cannot publish more records
by balancing the publishing records among different groups. This is because the divergence
constraint is group-free in UP . It is only determined by the number of published records in
UP and LP , which can be derived as follows.
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∆(P, P ′) =
1
2
||P − P ′||1 = 1
2
L∑
i=1
|Pi − P ′i | (3.10)
=
1
2
(
∑
UP
(Pi − P ′i ) +
∑
LP
(P ′i − Pi)) (3.11)
=
1
2
(
∑
UP |upi|
Kq
−
∑
UP |up′i|∑
UP&LP |up′i|
(3.12)
+
∑
LP |lp′i|∑
UP&LP |up′i|
−
∑
LP |lpi|
Kq
), (3.13)
where |upi| and |up′i| stand for the total and published numbers of records with physical
status upi, |lpi| and |lp′i| stand for physical status lpi accordingly. We can see that only
the total number of records in each group affects the divergence constraint. As a whole,
when considering the records in the first social profiles, a maximum number of records are
published in the first iteration.
For the second iteration, when upk has record Rj left with social status U2, we consider
the following cases:
1) if it violates the divergence constraint, no more records can be published.
2) if it violates the consistency principle, no more records can be published. This is
because we already published a maximum number of records with social status U1.
3) if it violates the dissimilarity constraint, DOSM replaces it with the records in the
same group upk, until there are no records with social profile U1 or the replacement violates
the consistency principle.
For all the remaining cases, DOSM can publish record Rj. As a whole, after the second
iteration, DOSM also publishes a maximum number of records from UP with social status
U2, and also a maximum number of records with social status in {U1, U2}.
Finally, the situation is similar for all the remaining iterations. The only difference is
that replacement may happen on multiple previous status, which can also be covered by our
analysis for the second iteration. The proof is finished.
Based on the conclusions in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. DOSM publishes a maximal number of records, i.e., no more records can be
published when the whole record set for each user is processed by DOSM.
Now, we discuss the time complexity of DOSM. In the baseline publishing phase,
the algorithm runs at most |LP | rounds, where |LP | = O(Kq) is the total number of
records in LP . In each round, it checks at most |UP | = O(Kq) records in UP . For each
record, it checks at most C social status. Then the time consumption for the first phase is
O(|LP |·—UP—·C) = O(C · K2q ). During the first and second steps of the bounded pub-
lishing phase, the algorithm runs at most O(|UP |) time. During the third step, it checks at
most |UP | records. For each record, it checks the previous social status in the group, which
takes no more than C time. Then the time complexity is O(2|UP |+C · |UP |) = O(C ·Kq).
Therefore, the time complexity of DOSM is O(C · K2q ), where C is the number of social
status, and Kq is the total number of records.
3.4.3 Adaptive Algorithm towards Novel Generated Records
In real-world scenarios, users keep submitting new records over time, and both their
social profiles and physical profiles evolve. Therefore, we need an adaptive algorithm to
handle this challenge. We extend our algorithm for this scenario, which is called Adaptive
DOSM (A-DOSM).
The first challenge is the time-dependent evolution of profiles. Users may change their
physical profiles due to the changing of their life styles. The same phenomenon also exists
for the social profiles. The underlying consequence is that recent records can better depict
true profiles. As a result, our adaptive algorithm must take time into consideration when
publishing records. We have the modified physical profile and social profile defined as follows.
Pi =
∑
{Rj |∀j≤Kq ,PHj=pi}wp(Tj)∑
Lq
wp(Tj)
, (3.14)
Ui =
∑
{Rj |∀j≤Kq ,UTj=ui}
ws(Tj), (3.15)
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where wp(·) and ws(·) refer to the time-dependent weight functions for the records in the
physical and social profiles, and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Kq}. A-DOSM should maintain privacy and
utility based on these two new definitions. wf (·) and ws(·) could be any feasible function
capturing the time sensitiveness for records. Generally, they are set to be monotonic decreas-
ing as time elapses. Besides, users usually prefer to publish their recent generated records,
which can show their liveness and attract more followers. As a result, the algorithm must
priorly publish new records.
As a second challenge, service providers or users run A-DOSM periodically to maintain
novel records. The reason to choose batched updating instead of the instant manner is that
the physical profiles often change with the appearance of a batch of reviews. Then service
providers or users must gather a fair number of records, and investigate the change in the
physical profiles. Otherwise, the privacy on physical profile is difficult to preserve.
Generally, A-DOSM is extended from DOSM by making the following modifications:
i) During the baseline publishing phase, all the records published in the previous rounds
are set to be published, and the algorithm re-calculates UP and LP according to the current
physical profiles.
ii) When there are multiple records to be selected, A-DOSM always selects the record
with the most recent generated date.
iii) A-DOSM still follows the divergence constraint, and uses the dissimilarity constraint
and consistency principle as auxiliary.
A-DOSM no longer aims at publishing a maximal number of records. Instead, it prefers
to publish more recent records, which follows the intuition that users are more willing to
publish their new events. Meanwhile, A-DOSM can always find a solution with fixed δ
no matter how the physical profile evolves. It means that even if the previous observed
physical profiles happen to be identical with the current one, our adaptive algorithm can still
find a solution following the divergence constraint. The proof is straightforward. Consider
the extreme case, where the current general physical profile is identical with the observed
profile in the last execution of A-DOSM. Then A-DOSM can simply publish all the records
35
generated no later than the last execution time. Then the observed physical profile follows
the divergence constraint since the measurement of divergence is symmetric.
Finally, the time complexity of A-DOSM is no larger than that of DOSM since A-DOSM
only considers partial reviews. It is bounded by O(C ·K2q ).
3.5 Discussion
In this section, we mainly discuss some other privacy issues in CPSSs. We first address
the abnormal behaviors in CPSSs and the corresponding threats on privacy, and then briefly
discuss the privacy issues on multiple status.
Users may stay in some abnormal physical or social status. For example, in an LBSS,
they may visit some locations far away, or try some new food. Such status has little con-
tributions for the general profiles, but may still have impacts on both privacy and utility
in CPSSs. On the one hand, the abnormal physical status is itself sensitive since it refers
to the unfamiliar behavior of a user. The abnormal social status contributes to the liveness
of a user. It indicates the followers can always expect some records from the user on novel
events. Fortunately, both sides can be properly handled. On the physical aspect, the abnor-
mal status can be treated as an isolated action. Therefore, the sensitive information can be
preserved by the existing works on privacy for physical data. Meanwhile, publishing the few
records with abnormal social status does not affect the privacy on physical profiles. When
a user has a considerable number of records with different abnormal social status, one can
merge them together and treat them as novel social status.
Finally, we notice that each record sometimes has multiple physical status and social
status. For example, fitness data is often packed with location information, and a visit to
some expensive restaurant may be treated as a symbol for both preference and wealthy. The
thorough study of the multiple status requires a comprehensive understanding of a CPSS
from both physical and social sides. We will consider it in our future study.
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Table 3.2. Statistics for each city
City # Active
Users
Madison, WI 158
Charlotte, NC 372
Las Vegas, NV 2106
Phoenix, AZ 856
Pittsburgh,
PA
272
3.6 Experiments
We evaluate our framework towards the public dataset provided by Yelp [140]. It in-
cludes more than 1.6 million reviews on local businesses, corresponding businesses, and user
information from ten cities across four countries. In our evaluation, we employ the reviews
in the following five cities: Madison, WI; Charlotte, NC; Las Vegas, NV; Phoenix, AZ; and
Pittsburgh, PA. We mainly consider the users with more than 30 reviews. On the one hand,
these users are more likely to reveal their own physical and social profiles. On the other
hand, they are also regarded as active users who form the core of the CPSS. To preserve
their privacy is a critical and challenging task. The number of qualified users in each city is
given in Table 2.
We define the physical status as the location of each business. Furthermore, we partition
the area of each city into 3*3 grids. Each grid refers to a unique physical status in the physical
profile, i.e., a set of locations visited by users. The social status is defined as the category
of the business in every review, for example, fast food restaurant, dinner, grocery, museum,
etc. We further merge the scarce categories together, and derive four categories for social
status: regular restaurant, bars and pubs, featured food, and other services.
We compare our algorithm with a baseline random algorithm which also partitions the
records into two groups in the same manner as our algorithm. 1) For the lower group, the
algorithm randomly selects the records following the consistency principle until no more
records can be published. 2) For the upper group, the algorithm randomly picks a record
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from the feasible set in each round, and updates the set after each selection. The feasible
set includes all the records that can be published while following both constraints and the
consistency principle. It terminates when the feasible set is empty. The upper and lower
group has the same definition as is introduced in DOSM algorithm, where the upper (lower)
group refers to the set of location visited more (less) frequently by a user. We evaluate the
performance on the aspects of the total number of published records and the ratio of the
users achieving the divergence constraint.
3.6.1 Basic Performance
In this part, we evaluate the basic performance of DOSM. We are interested in the
number of published records under various settings of privacy. Specifically, users usually
have heterogeneous sensitivity on their private information, which leads to different δ values.
Meanwhile, we investigate how the physical profile itself affects the performance on the
published records. We wonder whether some types of profiles are more sensitive.
In our first evaluation, we set the divergence constraint δ to be [0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7],
and estimate the ratio of records that are published in the algorithm. The upper bound is
derived by adding up the total number of records in the lower group and the dissimilarity
constraints for all the physical status in the upper group. As we see from Fig.3.1, the total
ratio of the published records decreases as δ increases. In all the five cities, the ratio is below
0.3 when δ ≥ 0.4. Usually, a larger δ refers to a more significant obfuscation on the physical
profile. One must hide more records in the upper group to achieve the transformation on
the whole physical profile. It indicates that users must make a trade-off between privacy
and utility. We also find that DOSM is comparable to the optimal performance. The pub-
lished records achieve 95% of the upper bound in most cases. Finally, DOSM outperforms
the baseline random algorithm by more than 40%. Our algorithm publishes more records
from both groups since it considers them all at once (step 2 of phase 1 in DOSM), and
supports dynamic modification in each social status (step 3 of phase 2 in DOSM). However,
the baseline algorithm looks for a feasible solution in a brute-force manner.
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(c) Pittsburgh, PA
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(d) Las Vegas, NV
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(e) Phoenix, AZ
Figure 3.1. The ratio of published records in different cities with various δ values.
Next, we consider the impact of physical profiles on the ratio of published records.
We set the divergence constraint δ to be 0.2, and investigate the performance for the users
in Las Vegas. We utilize the ratio of the records belonging to the lower group, and use
the minimum support in the physical status as our study dimension. The first dimension
corresponds to the variance of the physical profile, while the second one is related to the
peak and bottom values in the profile. As shown in Fig.3.2, DOSM can publish more records
when the ratio of the records belonging to the lower group increases. The reason is that it
can lead to a larger upper bound on the published records. We also find that when the ratio
is small, DOSM performs much better than the baseline random algorithm. It indicates that
one must carefully select the set of published records when physical profile is unbalanced.
An isolated and naive strategy is ineffective in this case. Finally, we conclude from Fig.3.3
that the performance of DOSM changes insignificantly with different minimum supports in
the physical status. The minimum support indicates the physical status (or the subregion
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in LBSN) with the smallest value in physical profile. One reason from the local business
service system is that most users have visited several times in some unfamiliar area. This
behavior cannot be regarded as an abnormal event and ignored, while it has small supports
in the physical status. Therefore, the few appeared physical status does not affect the ratio
of the published records.
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Figure 3.2. Published ratio with different size of records in lower group.
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Figure 3.3. Published ratio with different minimum support status.
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3.6.2 Individual-Level Performance
In this part, we study the performance of DOSM for each user. We first investigate the
number of the users who cannot find a feasible publishing solution under various δ. Secondly,
we randomly select a user in the dataset, and study the changing of her social and physical
profiles under privacy preservation.
In our first instance, we evaluate the number of the users who fail to find a possible
solution in DOSM. We set the divergence constraint from 0.1 to 0.7 and count the number of
the failed users. As shown in Fig.3.4, in all the cities, DOSM has a good performance for all
δ values. In all the cities except Phoenix, DOSM has the first failure when δ = 0.4, which is
already a radical setting on privacy. Furthermore, even when δ is 0.7, our algorithm can still
serve considerable number of users, i.e., about 70% in Madison, around 75% in Charlotte,
Pittsburgh, Las Vegas, and more than 80% in Phoenix.
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Figure 3.4. Ratio of failed users under various δ values.
Secondly, we check the social profile and physical profile for an arbitrary user. The user
has 425 reviews in Madison, and we run DOSM for various δ values. The general profile and
the obfuscated profiles are shown in Fig.?? and Fig.3.6. The nine indexes in the x-axis refer
to the 9 geographical grids in Fig.??, while the indexes in Fig.3.6 refer to regular restaurant,
bars and pubs, featured food, and other services. As we see, while the modified physical
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(c) δ = 0.3
Figure 3.5. Physical profiles for various δ values.
profiles are significantly different from the general profile, the observed social profiles in
Fig.3.6 still follow the same order with the general one.
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Figure 3.6. Social profiles for various δ values.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we investigate the problem of privacy preservation in CPSSs which
inherit features from both cyber-physical systems and social networks and face novel privacy
issues. A thoroughly designed countermeasure is expected to handle the privacy issues for
physical data, while maintaining a good utility as in social networks. We prove that the
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proposed algorithm can achieve a maximal number of published records. The evaluation on
real dataset validates the effectiveness of the algorithm on both physical privacy and social
utility. Our study could work as a general tool in preserving users’ privacy when they share
their physical data with others in CPSSs.
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Chapter 4
A PRIVATE AND EFFICIENT MECHANISM FOR PHYSICAL DATA
UPLOADING
4.1 Motivation
Numerous devices, ranging from smartphones to vehicles [141], are contributing to the
tremendous development of novel smart cyber-physical systems (CPSs). This feature makes
smart cyber-physical systems divergent from typical CPSs, as more diverse and confident
contents are involved. Most users participate in the system by uploading their local generated
contents like images, videos, or textual data. Such data include the information for physical
world, which could be utilized by the system for further computation. Besides supporting
the functions of a system, participants are also expected to conserve energy by uploading the
minimum size of data [66] [142]. This principle is critical for the cyber-physical system since
there are a large number of participants, and decreasing the energy used for data uploading
can significantly reduce resource consumption, which is essential for long-term processing of
the system [143]. However, due to the fact that the generated contents are closely related to
the physical status of a participant, simply uploading contents with energy concern may lead
to substantial disclosure of sensitive information. For example, location, current activity, and
companions may be revealed by the uploaded videos. This chapter considers a novel data
uploading mechanism that can achieve energy efficiency while preserving privacy.
As current cyber-physical systems start to collect the data from smart devices, it is
very likely for a system to get fine-grained access to the physical status of participants. For
instance, smartphones may have more than ten embedded sensors, making it possible to
record integrated information from users [144]. In this case, what contents to be uploaded
must be carefully selected to control the disclosure of sensitive information. The scenarios
for some typical CPSs like smart home or smart vehicle [145] may be even more challenging.
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Considering the systems which comprehensively cover the daily life of a family, the data
uploading mechanism simply designed for energy efficiency may allow third-party servers to
access some detailed behavior information of the family members [146]. Therefore, a well-
designed content uploading mechanism must simultaneously consider energy consumption,
privacy preservation, and the function of the system.
Unfortunately, none of the existing works can take care of all the three factors. There
have been a large body of works focusing on data uploading for smart CPSs. They mainly
focus on energy efficiency or privacy preservation. For the first fold, the existing mechanisms
investigate the trade-off between system utility like the coverage of a sensing area [147], the
number of participants, and energy consumption for each participant based on their hetero-
geneous behaviors. For the second fold, they preserve sensitive information of participants by
regulating or obfuscating the uploaded data, which potentially limits the utility provided by
each participant. Applications like crowd-sensing consider the cost and sensitivity of tasks
simultaneously. However, it is infeasible for general CPSs, since they tend to treat tasks and
underlying privacy issues trivially and focus on deriving a fairness task assignment.
To derive an optimal uploading scheme considering both energy efficiency and privacy
preservation is challenging. Firstly, as the contents often include information in multiple
dimensions, the information supporting the functionality of cyber physical systems and the
sensitive information could be either correlated or independent. Therefore, it may be infea-
sible to utilize a single measurement to evaluate a content on both sides. When multiple
measurements are applied, they can be irrelevant with each other. In this case, it is non-
trivial to use a single strategy to extract reasonable uploading contents.
Actually, besides the difficulty in extracting the correlation between the energy domain
and the privacy domain, to thoroughly handle the challenge on each aspect alone is also non-
trivial. It could take exponential time to derive the contents supporting the system functions
with the minimum cost. Meanwhile, participants may expose their abnormal behaviors even
without consciousness. This is due to the fact that they lack the ability on obtaining the
information beneath these contents. Finally, as cyber physical systems are designed to play
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roles in some critical components of our life, the uploaded contents must support the normal
functioning of the system, which is sometimes even more important than energy conservation
and private preservation. In summary, there is still a gap between the existing data uploading
mechanisms and the needs of CPSs.
As a result, this work proposes a novel mechanism to mitigate the gap. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that can simultaneously preserve privacy and conserve energy
for data uploading. In our framework, participants receive tasks from a cyber-physical system
requesting them to collect a series of local information. Then the participants generate a set
of contents and utilizes the proposed mechanism to derive the set of contents to be uploaded.
Furthermore, the proposed mechanism allows each participant to set personalized preference
on privacy, and can preserve privacy according to the specified preferences.
More specifically, our work assumes each content owns a set of features, and an assigned
task also presents a set of features to be discovered in the uploaded contents. For example, a
system requests the monitoring of several objects along a road, and a participant has many
photos each including some objects. Then the participant should upload the photos that
can cover all the requested objects. Meanwhile, each content includes some other physical
information of the participant, such as the location where a picture was taken. Considering
the privacy, our framework requests that all the participants in a community remain similar,
so that only limited private information is disclosed from the published data.
To achieve the design goals, the proposed mechanism preserves privacy by hiding highly
abnormal contents, while accomplishing an assigned task by uploading a minimum number
of extra contents that may be less energy efficient but are insensitive. We prove that the
problem of deriving the optimal solution is NP-hard. Hence we propose a two-phase heuristic
algorithm that first achieves a local optimal uploading sets, and then modifies the results for
privacy preservation.
Furthermore, our work investigates the proportion of the participants whose uploaded
contents are modified due to the existence of private information, as well as the number
of the participants who cannot accomplish a task due to privacy preservation constraints.
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The two metrics help with deriving how the existence of sensitive information impacts re-
source consumption and the normal procedure of smart cyber-physical systems. Our main
contributions are as follows:
1. This chapter considers the problem of data uploading for cyber-physical systems that
balances privacy preservation and energy conservation.
2. This chapter proposes a novel system model which captures the requests of each task,
energy consumption, and privacy preservation.
3. This chapter proves the complexity of the identified problem, proposes a corresponding
heuristic algorithm, and analyzes the performance of the algorithm.
4. This chapter validates the performance of the algorithm with real dataset. The exten-
sive results reveal the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. The problem formulation is in-
troduced in Section II. Section III discusses the complexity of the identified problem and
introduces the proposed algorithm. Section IV analyzes the performance of the algorithm
and discusses some special cases of the problem. Section V validates the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of the algorithm towards real world dataset. Section VI summarizes the chapter.
4.2 Problem Formulation
This section introduces the general system input, the definition of utility, and the re-
quirements of privacy preservation.
4.2.1 System Input
Assume a smart cyber-physical system includes M participants {W1,W2, · · · ,WH}.
Each participant Wi generates a series of contents {Ci1, Ci2, · · · , CiKi}, which could be mul-
timedia or textual data used for the subsequent computation and service. Each content
includes a set of features, denoted as Fij = {fij1, fij2, · · · , fijNij}. The features refer to the
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concerned physical information, like the set of objects or events concerned by the system.
For example, a content could be a photo taken by a participant, and the features could be
a series of target objects appeared in the photo. All the potential features compose the
Candidate Set F = {f1, f2, · · · , fK0}.
Meanwhile, we assume each content Cij has a corresponding physical status Lij. It could
be the location where the content was generated, or the on-going activity of the participant.
By collecting a sufficient number of contents from a single participant, the system is able to
derive the participant’s physical profile. We further define the profile of participant Wi as
P 0i = {p0i1, p0i2, · · · , p0iN}, (4.1)
where p0ij ∈ (0, 1), and
∑N
j=1 p
0
ij = 1. Each p
0
ij is calculated as follows:
p0ij =
|{Cik|k ≤ Ki, Lik = Lj}|
Ki
. (4.2)
p0ij refers to the probability that Wi appears in the jth physical status Lj, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
For instance, it could refer to a subregion in a city, or a transport tool.
4.2.2 Utility
In a smart cyber-physical system, the participants are assigned tasks to collect in-
formation about local objects. For participant Wi, the assigned task is denoted as Ti =
{ti1, ti2, · · · , tiK0}, where tij ∈ {0, 1}. tij = 1 means participant Wi should collect the infor-
mation for feature Fj, and tij = 0 otherwise. Then each participant is actually assigned a
set of features that should be included in the contents to be uploaded. Define binary vari-
able Iij ∈ {0, 1} as the indicator for whether Wi uploads content Cij, where Iij = 1 means
the corresponding content is uploaded. We say participant Wi accomplishes task Ti when
∀tij, tij = 1, ∃Cil, Iil = 1 and fj ∈ Fil, i.e., all the features in the task are included in the
uploaded contents.
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Besides system utility, participants also consider resource consumption during data
uploading. They try to decrease energy consumption or bandwidth used for a task, so as to
retain resource for other utilities as well as be friendly to the environment, which is one of
the core design principles of smart cyber-physical systems. Assume each content Cij has an
uploading cost, denoted as Bij. Then the total cost for Wi is
Ki∑
j=1
Iij ·Bij. (4.3)
4.2.3 Privacy
We assume adversaries could be any third party users, system builders, or even basic
users who have access to the uploaded contents. Adversaries are honest but curious. They
infer sensitive information from the observed profiles. More specifically, adversaries search
for the participants with abnormal profiles. These participants are considered as sensitive
users, and are very likely to suffer further attacks. Assume participant Wi is in community
Gi with several other participants, who are close friends with each other. The average profile
of the community is PGi = {pGi1, pGi2, · · · , pGiN}, where pGij =
∑
Wm∈Gi
p0mj
|Gi| . Meanwhile,
the observed profile for Wi is Pi = {pi1, pi2, · · · , piN}, which is derived from the uploaded
contents of Wi. Then we define the exposure of Wi as the relative entropy between Pi and
PGi , which is defined by the following formula:
D(Pi||PGi) =
N∑
j=1
pijln
pij
pGij
. (4.4)
Furthermore, each participant may set a threshold on this divergence, noted as δ. Then
in the uploaded data, the relative entropy for each participant should be bounded by the
threshold to guarantee adversaries cannot learn significantly private information from the
observed profiles.
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4.2.4 Design Object
Our object is to derive a publishing scheme for each participant, so that a given task can
be successfully accomplished and the personal profile under the threshold can be preserved,
while minimizing the uploading cost. We formalize the problem as follows:
min
Ki∑
j=1
Iij ·Bij (4.5)
s.t. Iij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ki (4.6)
D(Pi||PGi) ≤ θi ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , H} (4.7)
Ki∑
l=1
Iil · I(fj ∈ Fil) ≥ 1 ∀tij, tij = 1, (4.8)
where I(fj ∈ Fil) = 1 when fj ∈ Fil, and I(fj ∈ Fil) = 0 when fj 6∈ Fil.
4.3 Data Uploading Framework
In this section, we first analyze the complexity of the formulated problem. Then we
introduce the framework. In the third part, the algorithm for selecting the contents to be
uploaded is presented.
4.3.1 Complexity
The problem of deriving the minimum number of contents to be uploaded following
constraints (5.9) and (4.8) is NP-hard. We consider a special case where a participant
sets the threshold on the relative entropy to be no larger than 1. In this case, there is no
constraint for privacy preservation. Then our problem is just the typical minimum set cover
problem, where each content is a candidate set and all the features of a task are the elements
to be covered. The minimum set cover problem is proved to be NP-hard, which means our
problem is also NP-hard.
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The problem is NP-hard even when the threshold is less than 1. Assume we achieve
the minimum set of uploading contents without any limitation. Then the set is modified
for privacy preservation, which means some contents in the minimum set must be replaced
when their physical status deviates too much from the expected value in the average profile.
In this case, the problem is changed to looking for a minimum set of contents in some other
status such that the union of their features covers the replaced contents. This is also an
NP-hard problem.
4.3.2 Overview of The Framework
Our framework runs on a participant’s site. participants first receive a task from a
smart cyber-physical system, which includes a set of features to be monitored. Then the
framework analyzes the features included by each content. This procedure is done either
on a participant’s site or by some trustable third-party servers. After this procedure, the
framework acquires the threshold from participants as well as the average profile of the
community from the server. The average profile could be inferred from the historical data of
all related participants, which is uploaded when participants have more convenient or low-
cost access to the network. By collecting all the inputs, the framework constitutes a set of
uploading contents. When the generated contents follow all the constraints, the framework
simply uploads them. Otherwise, the framework notifies the participants that it is infeasible
to complete the task under the current privacy constraint and provides an alternative scheme.
The participants determine whether to upload the contents at last.
4.3.3 Content Selection Algorithm
We now introduce the algorithm for deriving the set of uploading contents, which is
called the Greedy Content Modification algorithm (GCM for short). GCM has two
phases. In the first phase, GCM searches for a feasible set of contents covering all the
features in a task. In the second phase, GCM revises the contents one by one until the
uploading contents also follow the privacy constraint.
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For the first phase, GCM follows the category of typical heuristic algorithms designed for
the set cover problem. It iteratively selects the contents whose features cover the maximum
number of uncovered features in a task, until all the features are included in the selected
contents. Initially, GCM assigns for a task a vector Si = {si1, si2, · · · , siK0}, which indicates
whether each feature in the task is covered. All the entries of Si are set to 0 at the beginning.
In each iteration, GCM evaluates the following information for each non-determined content
Cij:
NCCij =
|{fijk|∃fl = fijk, til = 1, sil = 0}|
Bij
, (4.9)
where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Ki}, fijk is the kth feature in content Cij, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nij}, and
| · | refers to the number of elements in the set. Then GCM selects the content with the
maximum NCCij , sets Iij = 1, and updates Si by changing the entries of those newly covered
features to 1. GCM moves to the next phase when all the required features in Ti are covered
and the relative entropy is still above the threshold. In other cases, GCM terminates, and
either uploads the selected content or sends notice to the participants.
For the second phase, GCM updates the results in the previous phase, and looks for a
feasible solution that follows the privacy constraint. The main idea in this phase is to use
the minimum cost of extra contents to decrease the relative entropy below the threshold.
Assume the uploading decision for participant Wi is I = {I1, I2, · · · , IKi}. In each
iteration, GCM first partitions the set of physical status L = {L1, L2, · · · , LN} into two
categories: lower case and upper case. The lower case refers to the status that would lead
to the decrease of relative entropy, if GCM uploads one content belonging to that status,
i.e.,
D(PI ||PGI ) > D(PIj ||PGI ), (4.10)
where Ij is the same as I except for uploading one more content with physical status Lj.
Meanwhile, the upper case accordingly refers to the status that would lead to the increase
of the relative entropy.
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As a first step, GCM checks for each uploaded content in the upper case. It searches
in the lower case for the contents that include all the features covered by an upper-case
content selected in the previous phase. When there are multiple candidate contents in the
lower case, GCM selects the one leading to the most change in the relative entropy. More
specifically, the features only refer to the ones newly covered in the first phase when the
replaced upper-case content is selected. GCM changes the uploading indicators for the two
contents when a matching is discovered. Then GCM updates the relative entropy and the
status in the upper and lower cases. This procedure stops when the relative entropy falls
below the threshold or no replacement exists.
As a second step, GCM selects the contents from the lower case to further decrease the
relative entropy. It ranks each non-determined content according to its scale of change
on the relative entropy, i.e., the difference between relative entropies when Cij is uploaded
or not, denoted as Div(Cij).
Div(Cij) =
D(PI ||PGI )−D(PIj ||PGI )
Bij
. (4.11)
When multiple contents have the same Div(Cij), GCM ranks them according to the number
of features they cover for currently uploading contents in the upper case.
As a third step, GCM selects the first content Cir1 in the ranking list and sets Iir1 = 1.
After the selection, GCM checks whether any content in the upper case with Iij = 1 is covered
with the previous determined contents. If so, GCM first removes the covered content from
the uploading set. All the previous determined contents covering this content are marked as
exclusive contents.
When the relative entropy is still above the threshold, GCM continues ranking and
selecting a next non-determined content. In this scenario, GCM updates the relative entropy,
Div(·), uploading set I , and goes back to the second step for the next iteration.
Otherwise, when the threshold is reached, GCM starts to trace back. It checks the
newly determined contents according to the reversed order of their determination, which
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means GCM always selects the content which leads to the minimum increase on the relative
entropy. If the content is marked as exclusive, GCM searches for the next one. Otherwise,
GCM removes the content from the uploading set. The tracing back ends when removing
any content violates the privacy constraint, and GCM stops.
Finally, GCM uploads all the contents with Iij = 1 in the uploading decision vector and
terminates.
4.4 Performance Analysis
In this section, we first analyze the time complexity of GCM. Then we prove GCM can
always find a feasible uploading scheme for our problem when such a solution exists. Finally,
we analyze the extra cost caused by the existence of privacy issues.
4.4.1 Time Complexity
In the first phase, it takes O(K0) time to consider the number of newly covered features
for each content, where K0 is the total number of features. In each round, GCM checks this
number for all the contents, which means the time spent in each round is O(KiK0). Finally,
it takes O(Ki) rounds in the worst case to derive the feasible uploading contents. Therefore,
the time consumption for the first phase is O(K2iK0).
In the second phase, GCM terminates in O(Ki) rounds since it adds one content in each
round, and the removed contents are not be considered again. In each round, it takes (N)
time to calculate DIV (·) for all the contents, and O(K2i ) time to sort the contents. The
time used for maintaining the parameters is O(max{N,Ki, Ki ·K0}). Meanwhile, the time
spent on the tracing back is O(Ki). Therefore, the time consumption for each iteration in
the second phase is O(max{N,K2i , Ki, Ki · K0}). As the numbers of physical status and
contents for each participants are usually finite and moderate, the time consumption for
each iteration is O(Ki ·K0).
Generally, the total time complexity of GCM is O(K2maxK0), where Kmax is the maxi-
mum number of contents generated by a participant, and K0 is the total number of features.
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4.4.2 Completeness
We now prove that GCM can always derive a feasible solution when it exists. This is
an essential property since the completeness of tasks forms the basis for the functionality of
cyber-physical systems. Missing a feasible solution from any participant may lead to the lack
of information for a monitored area, so as to limit the performance of a system. We prove
this property by analyzing its converse-negative proposition, which is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. When GCM cannot find a set of contents that regulates the relative entropy
below the threshold and include all the required features in the task, there are no feasible set
of contents by which the participants can complete the assigned task.
Proof. GCM may terminate in both phases without generating a feasible solution.
1) When this failure termination happens in the first phase, it means some required
features in the task do not exist in the participant’s contents. Then there are always no
feasible solutions.
2) When the termination appears in the second phase, it means uploading any one of
the remaining contents will increase the relative entropy. This is due to the fact that GCM
always adds the contents in the lower case into the uploading set until it is empty or a feasible
solution is derived. In this case, one of the following two facts must hold: i) There are too
few contents in the lower case. Then it is infeasible to achieve the threshold on the relative
entropy even if all these contents are uploaded, which means the profiles of the participant
diverge too much from the average profiles. In this case, there is no feasible solution since
no mechanisms can achieve a profile under the threshold. ii) There are some contents in
the lower case, but some contents in the upper case have unique features requested by the
task. To upload such contents aggravates the divergence between the two profiles, and the
remaining contents in the lower case cannot regulate the profiles to the expected distribution.
In this case, no mechanism can derive a feasible solution, since all of them must upload the
contents with unique features to complete the task.
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Generally, GCM can find a feasible solution if it exists.
According to Theorem 2, GCM guarantees the completeness in deriving the feasible
solutions.
4.4.3 Effectiveness
We now analyze the effectiveness of GCM. More specifically, we analyze the extra re-
source requested to regulate the relative entropy for a participant. This is a critical metric
since the object of our problem is to derive a data uploading scheme with low energy con-
sumption.
First of all, it is easy to see that GCM can achieve a minimum resource consumption,
which means no contents can be removed from the uploading set, while GCM can still
accomplish the task and maintain the relative entropy. The proof is included in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. When GCM achieves a feasible solution for uploading data, it must achieve a
local minimized resource consumption.
Proof. The conclusion is proved in three situations:
1) When GCM terminates in the first phase, removing any content leads to the failure
of the task. Then no contents can be removed.
2) When GCM terminates in the first step of Phase 2, removing any content also leads
to the failure of the task. Otherwise, assume GCM changes CU1 with CL1, and CU2 with
CL2. Then if there is another content CU3 whose contents are also covered by CL1
⋃
CL2,
CU3 can also be removed without violating any constraint. However, it means CL1 and CL2
cover more features than CU1, CU2, and CU3, which means they should be chosen in the first
phase. Therefore, there should be no such CU3s, and no contents can be removed.
3) When GCM terminates in other cases, it means GCM will trace back to remove the
previous determined contents, until no contents can be further deleted.
In general, GCM can achieve a local minimized resource consumption.
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Finally, we analyze the extra resource required in the second phase, which is considered
as the scale of the concession on the energy efficiency towards privacy preservation. Due to
the fact that there is no assumption on the correlation between the two aspects, it is difficult
to directly analyze the effectiveness of GCM. However, GCM holds two principles, which are
both effective for limiting the extra resource consumption.
Firstly, GCM selects in each iteration the contents leading to the maximum change in
the relative entropy, and traces back via iteratively selecting the contents with the minimum
change in the relative entropy. It means GCM follows the gradient descending strategy.
Considering that the relative entropy is a convex function, GCM introduces the minimum
extra cost to regulate the profiles.
Meanwhile, GCM selects the contents covering the most features for those uploading
contents in the upper case. In this scenario, GCM can remove some contents from the upper
case, which can further reduce the extra cost. However, as GCM selects contents priorly
based on the relative entropy, it can only select the maximum number of covering contents
in a given status, which leads to the difficulty in bounding the number of the removed
contents and the scale of their impacts on the relative entropy.
4.5 Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of GCM towards a real world dataset from Yelp [140].
Yelp is a location-based service system where reviewers publish reviews and comments for
nearby businesses. In the evaluation, reviewers are considered as participants, and reviews
are considered as contents. Each content refers to a business that includes a set of tags in
the category, which are regarded as features. Therefore, each participant receives a task
including some tags, and uploads a set of contents covering these tags.
Three cities are considered in our evaluation: Charlotte, NC; Phoenix, AZ; and Pitts-
burgh, PA. Specifically, we focus on the active participants with more than 30 contents. The
numbers of active participants are introduced in Table . The area of each city is divided into
3 by 3 grids. The physical profile is the ratio of contents located in each grid, as each review
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Table 4.1. Statistics for each city
City # Active
Users
Charlotte, NC 372
Phoenix, AZ 856
Pittsburgh,
PA
272
has a corresponding grid. The average profile for each city is the average value evaluated
from the profiles of all the participants. The cost for uploading each content is set to 1.
We focus on two metrics: the ratio of the participants completing the task, and the extra
number of contents uploaded. Finally, GCM is compared with a baseline maximum feature
covering method, which is the same as the first phase of GCM.
4.5.1 General Performance
We validate the effectiveness of GCM from a global view. For each participant, 70%
of her features are randomly selected as the required features in the task. The threshold δ
ranges from 0.2 to 0.8.
Fig.4.1 shows the ratio of participants who complete their tasks while following the
threshold on relative entropy. As we can see, when the budget is small, both algorithms
suffer low ratios. The reason for GCM is that as some features uniquely appear in the
contents belonging to the upper case, it is infeasible to conceal them. Then the number of
contents in the lower case is insufficient to properly regulate the profiles. However, GCM can
still outperform the compared algorithm by around 50%, since it can regulate the profiles for
some participants. As threshold δ increases, both algorithms achieve a better performance,
to nearly 1 when δ = 0.8, since δ = 0.8 is a sufficient loose threshold on the relative entropy.
However, due to the unique existence of the features in upper case and the large divergence
with the average profile, there are always some participants who cannot accomplish the
tasks at last. Furthermore, we find that the performances for different cities are not the
same. It indicates the diversity of the underlying profiles in each city. For the cities with
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more population, e.g., Phoenix, the profiles are more heterogeneous. Then the algorithms
perform relatively worse when threshold δ is small.
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Figure 4.1. Ratio of successful tasks/participants under various δ.
Fig.4.2 shows the ratio of extra contents uploaded to accomplish the tasks, which indi-
cates the energy efficiency of GCM. As shown, the ratio of the contents uploaded by GCM
decreases as the threshold increases in all the three cities. The reason is that as the partic-
ipants allow a larger threshold, the requested regulation on the divergence also decreases.
Therefore, there are more chances to use the one-on-one replacement in the first step of
GCM to regulate the profiles in the uploaded contents. Meanwhile, the decrease on the
energy cost for the regulation also means GCM can upload fewer contents in the lower case.
As the threshold increases (when δ > 0.6), the energy cost of GCM is similar to that of the
baseline algorithm.
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Figure 4.2. Ratio of uploaded contents under various δ.
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Fig.4.3 indicates the ratio of the participants who consume the same energy as the
baseline algorithm, while also following the constraint on the relative entropy. We can see,
as threshold δ increases, GCM can find a larger ratio of such participants for all the three
cities (more than 60% when δ ≥ 0.5). Therefore, considering the fact that the baseline
algorithm has no consideration on the relative entropy, GCM is both efficient and effective
in regulating the profiles.
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Figure 4.3. Ratio of participants without extra energy cost.
4.5.2 Performance for Individuals
In this part, we investigate the performance of GCM for different types of participants.
Specifically, we focus on the participants with different relative entropies, and different ratios
between the total number of features and the contents. Threshold δ is set to 0.4, and 70%
of the features are selected in the task.
Fig.4.4 and Fig.4.5 show the ratio of the participants completing the tasks and the
energy cost with different values of the relative entropies. We can see, as the relative entropy
increases, the ratio falls significantly. It indicates that the participants with more divergent
profiles suffer more the probability of not having a feasible solution. Meanwhile, we conclude
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from Fig.4.5 that the ratio of the uploaded contents increases, which means the participants
with a larger relative entropy also need to upload more contents to regulate their profiles.
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Figure 4.4. Ratio of success tasks/participants under various
relative entropy.
Fig.4.6 and Fig.4.7 evaluate the performance of GCM for the participants with different
replicas of features. The replicas of the features for a participant are approximately esti-
mated as the ratio between the total number of different features and the contents owned by
her. According to Fig.4.6, the participants with more replicas have a generally better per-
formance, which means the replicas could partially eliminate the contents including unique
features, so as to help GCM generate feasible solutions. Fig.4.7 demonstrates that the en-
ergy consumptions are approximately stable for different participants, only changing less
than 10%. One reason is that when there is a feasible solution, the extra resource cost is
more likely to be dominated by the scale of the relative entropy.
In summary, GCM achieves effectiveness on the ratio of the accomplished tasks, and
efficiency on the resource consumption.
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Figure 4.5. Ratio of extra contents under various relative
entropies.
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Figure 4.6. Ratio of success tasks/participants under various
replicas.
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Figure 4.7. Ratio of extra contents under various replicas.
4.6 Summary
This chapter investigates a novel problem for data collection in smart cyber-physical
systems, where participants concern both energy conservation and privacy preservation for
uploading contents. In this work, each generated content has some features requested by a
system, which are related to potentially sensitive physical status, and also consumes some
resource for uploading. A novel framework and a corresponding two-phase algorithm are
proposed to derive the set of contents to be uploaded, which include the requested fea-
tures, conceal the sensitive physical status, and consume less resource. The performance of
the proposed algorithm is analyzed and the evaluation on a real world dataset reveals the
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed algorithm.
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Chapter 5
A FAIR MECHANISM FOR PRIVATE DATA PUBLICATION AMONG
MULTIPLE USERS
5.1 Motivation
The pervasive adoption of Online Social Networks (OSNs) has made this category of
systems a pivotal component for knowledge discovery [148]. Large scale of contents are gen-
erated in OSNs, owing to both the huge number of participants and various dimensions of the
available information [149]. Meanwhile, users in OSNs are willing to publish their contents
like ratings for restaurants or movies, which could be utilized by service providers to facil-
itate various kinds of services including content recommendation, friend recommendation,
etc [150] [151]. However, the careless publication of such a huge size of contents may lead to
severe disclosure of users’ sensitive information. For example, the sexual orientation may be
inferred from the movies watched by a user [152], and the residential area is usually close to
the frequently visited restaurants [153]. Therefore, a novel framework for data publication
in OSNs is designed in this work, which considers both privacy preservation and quality of
service for heterogeneous users.
In fact, the large scale of social data makes it possible for users to publish partial
contents [42], while service providers can still guarantee qualified services. Service providers
can utilize the contents gathered from multiple users to facilitate services. However, the
following new challenges emerge when a partial publication strategy is utilized.
Firstly, considering the pervasive existence of both direct and latent sensitive informa-
tion, users may have heterogeneous preferences on sensitive information. Their attitudes
could range from concealing all the contents to totally careless about private information or
even unconscious. As a result, each user should have a customized publication scheme which
can properly preserve privacy as expected.
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Secondly, users are usually correlated with each other in a service. For instance, to
recommend restaurants to a target user [154], a service provider selects the visited restaurants
from the users who share similar experiences with the target user. Therefore, a partial content
publication scheme should also properly choose the contents based on the correlation among
users.
More specifically, partially published contents should guarantee high quality of service,
which can be measured form two aspects. On the one hand, a majority of users should
receive qualified services based on the published contents. This requirement is essential since
users are correlated with each other, and some sensitive contents must be concealed, which
means it is usually infeasible to serve all users simultaneously. Take content recommendation
as an example. The published contents must help with providing a sufficient number of
recommended contents for as many users as possible. On the other hand, the published
contents should provide a fair service among users. As some users prefer to benefit more and
contribute more to a service, it is necessary to provide better services to the more active users.
Again, take content recommendation as an instance. The published contents should priorly
serve users sharing their own contents without limitation. In summary, a content publication
scheme should take into account privacy, utility, and fairness [155] simultaneously.
Unfortunately, these challenges have not been well addressed by the previous works.
The existing solutions mainly consider the scenario with identical preference on privacy
preservation, or the most stringent requirement among all users. These solutions, such
as differential privacy [156] and k-anonymity [157], obfuscate contents or statistical results
before publication. Some works allow personalized preference on privacy. However, such
works do not thoroughly consider the correlation among users. Most of them simply provide
service independently for each user, like perturbing location information according to the
user-specified noise level [158]. Applications like crowd-sensing [159] partially consider the
correlation among users. However, they mainly treat each user as an independent individual
to work on some common tasks, and are designed to achieve an equilibrium state.
65
This chapter mitigates the gap by designing a novel mechanism for content/data pub-
lication in OSNs. The mechanism properly preserves the private information for each user.
Meanwhile, the mechanism considers quality of service in terms of privacy, global utility
and fairness among users. The published contents can be utilized by third-party servers for
various subsequent services. As far as we know, this is the first study on content publication
in OSNs which integrates correlation among users, users’ heterogeneous privacy preferences,
and fairness among users.
For privacy preservation, the proposed framework assumes adversaries can fully access
the published contents and attack by running some inference functions on the data. The
inference functions range from the ones searching for directly sensitive contents to the ones
extracting latent private information. For example, an adversary may look for the restau-
rants near a hospital, or infers a user’s residential area by investigating the frequently visited
regions. Our framework thwarts all the attacks by deriving for each user all the sets of
sensitive contents leading to the disclosure of private information and avoiding publishing
them. Furthermore, users may select heterogeneous privacy preferences by setting differ-
ent thresholds on inference functions, which leads to different number and composition of
sensitive content sets.
For quality of service, our framework is mainly designed for one type of applications,
i.e., content-based recommendation applications. This category of applications include rec-
ommendation of interested contents, friend recommendation, etc. They firstly derive the
pairs of users who share similar contents, and then recommend their unique contents to
each other. Our framework guarantees that a maximal number of users can receive satisfied
recommendation results, which means the recommendation results are comparable to the
scenario where all the contents are published. Furthermore, our framework maintains fair-
ness among users. The activeness and priority are measured according to each user’s privacy
preference. A more flexible preference setting indicates more active user participation. Our
framework priorly serves the users with more flexible privacy settings among the users with
similar scale of published contents. To derive the content publishing scheme which serves the
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maximum number of users is proved to be NP-complete. Therefore, this work proposes an
effective heuristic algorithm and validates it towards a real-world dataset. Our contributions
are summarized as follows:
1. A novel content publication model which captures correlation among users, heteroge-
neous privacy settings, and service fairness is proposed.
2. We introduce a new definition for fairness which relates user priority to privacy setting.
3. An algorithm is proposed to strictly preserve sensitive information, balance perfor-
mance among users, and achieve a high global utility.
4. The corresponding analysis validates the performance of the proposed algorithm and
emphasizes the feasibility of our framework.
5. Extensive experiment results towards a real-world dataset demonstrate the effectiveness
of the algorithm.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II presents the prob-
lem formulation. Section III introduces the overview of the framework and the algorithm
for content publication. Section IV discusses the derivation of sensitive content sets and
some corresponding applications. The experiment results shown in Section V validate the
performance of the algorithm. Section VI concludes the chapter.
5.2 Problem Formulation
We consider data publication for typical OSNs. In this circumstance, the platform will
first get authorization and preferences on privacy from users and then publish their contents
to some third-party servers. The published contents can be utilized by third-party servers for
knowledge discovery to provide further services. Assume there are totally N users, denoted
as U = {u1, u2, · · · , uN}. Each user ui has a set of contents Ci = {ci1, ci2, · · · , ciKi}. The
contents could be a list of restaurants visited by a user, or movies once watched. All the
candidate contents form a content pool C0 = {c01, c02, · · · , c0K0}.
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System Utility: As our framework is mainly designed for content-based recommenda-
tion applications, it is critical to retain a sufficient number of similar users with each target
user in the published data. In this circumstance, similar users refer to the ones who own some
identical contents with the target user as well as some different contents. For simplicity, we
note the common contents between two users as similar contents, and the different ones
as diverse contents. Furthermore, the combination of the published different contents
from all the similar users determine the quality of service for the target user.
Formally, assume Iij is the indicator for the publication of cij, where Iij = 1 means
cij is published, and Iij = 0 otherwise. Then two users ui and ui′ are similar towards the
published data when
Dii′ =
∑
j≤Ki,j′≤Ki′ ,cij=ci′j′
IijIi′j′ ≥ δ, (5.1)
where δ is the threshold to determine the similarity of two users. Equation (1) means two
users are similar when they share no less than δ common contents in the published data.
Meanwhile, the service quality for a target user is dominated by the exclusive contents
published by all her similar users, which is evaluated as follows:
Qi′ =
|⋃Ni=1{cij|Iij = 1, Dii′ ≥ δ, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ki, cij 6∈ Ci′}|
|⋃Ni=1{cij|D0ii′ ≥ δ, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ki, cij 6∈ Ci′}| , (5.2)
where ui′ is the target user, | · | refers to the number of contents in the set, and D0ii′ is
the number of common contents when ui and u
′
i publish all their contents. Based on this
measurement, user ui is covered or successfully served when
Qi ≥ γ, (5.3)
which means the size of diverse contents in the published data covers more than γ of all
diverse contents.
Privacy: In this work, adversaries could be any third-party server which can access
the published data. Adversaries are assumed to be honest but curious, i.e., they extensively
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extract sensitive information from the published data. More specifically, an adversary holds
an inferring function f(·), which takes the published contents as the input, and is used to
infer the sensitive information of a user. For example, f(·) may check the existence of a
police office, the number of restaurants near a hospital, or the likelihood of getting a disease.
Based on the function, each user ui selects a preference factor θi on the sensitive information.
Denote the published data for user ui as C
′
i, then ui’s privacy is preserved when
m∑
k=1
|Pr(f(Ci) = k)− Pr(f(C ′i) = k)| ≥ θi. (5.4)
Therefore, a larger θi means ui concerns more on her sensitive information, and shows less
activeness in joining data publication.
Fairness: Besides utility and privacy, user fairness is another concern in content pub-
lishing. There are various definitions of fairness. In this work, we utilize privacy preference
as a reference to determine users’ priority levels accordingly. This measurement is intuitive
since users with more flexible preference settings are more willing to participate in and con-
tribute to content publication, which means they deserve a better service. According to
this evaluation method for priority levels, fairness is defined as the permission of selfishness
among users, which means users with higher priority levels are allowed to be selfish towards
users with lower priority levels. We formally define fairness as follows.
Definition 2 (Fairness). Assume two users ui and uj have different preference factors,
saying θi ≥ θj. Then the published contents are fair for ui and uj when at least one of the
following three conditions holds:
1) uj could still be covered without ui’s published contents;
2) ui’s published contents are used to cover uk and uk has a higher priority than uj;
3) ui and uj are not similar users.
Otherwise, ui must contribute to the coverage of uj. The term ”coverage” between two
users means 1) ui is similar to uj and, 2) ui owns some different contents for uj in the
published data.
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Finally, the objective is to design a content publication scheme which maximizes the
number of covered users, while preserving sensitive information under the preference factors
and guaranteeing user fairness. We formulate the problem as follows:
max
N∑
i=1
Gi (5.5)
s.t. Iij ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ki (5.6)
Gi = 1 ∀i, Qi ≥ γ (5.7)
Gi = 0 ∀i, Qi < γ (5.8)
F (C ′i) ≥ θi ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} (5.9)
C ′j
⋃
Div(Ci) 6= φ ∀uj contributes to ui, (5.10)
where Gi indicates whether ui is covered, F (C
′
i) =
∑m
k=1 |Pr(f(Ci) = k)− Pr(f(C ′i) = k)|,
and Div(Ci) =
⋃N
i′=1{ci′j|D0i′i ≥ δ, 1 ≤ j ≤ K ′i, ci′j 6∈ Ci}. Condition (5.6) means each
content is assigned a decision on whether to be published. Conditions (5.7) and (5.8) refer
to the coverage of a user. Conditions (5.9) and (4) denote user privacy and user fairness.
The list of notations is shown in Table 5.1.
5.3 Solution
In this section, we first analyze the complexity of the proposed problem, then introduce
the algorithm for determining the publication scheme in OSNs. The algorithm is called
Priority-Based Content Publishing Algorithm (PBCP for short).
5.3.1 Complexity
The proposed problem is an NP-complete problem. We prove this by reducing the
maximum independent set problem to ours. Assume there are two users in an OSN, and
they are similar to each other. According to the inferring function, each user has a set of
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tuples each composed of contents, and the publication of both contents belonging to any
tuple leads to privacy leakage. In this case, the tuples are considered as the edges between
contents. Now given ratio γ on the coverage of diverse contents, our problem is the same as
the decision problem of the independent set problem, which is NP-complete.
5.3.2 Data Structures
PBCP needs to maintain three data structures: sensitive sets, diverse vectors, and a
dependent graph. The sensitive sets refer to all the combination of the contents for a user
leading to the disclosure of sensitive information. A diverse vector records the set of contents
and covered contents belonging to the diverse set of a user. The dependent graph indicates
the similarity between users.
Sensitive Sets. Based on the function, each user has a set of tuples of contents that may
lead to the disclosure of sensitive information, i.e., based on these contents, adversaries can
successfully infer some private information via the inferring function. A successful inference
means the requested privacy preservation in Equation 5.4 is violated. Denote the sensitive
content sets for ui as {SSi = ssi1 = {cij1 , · · · }, · · · , ssiEi = {cijEi , · · · }}, where each ssij is a
minimum set that may lead to the disclosure. To preserve privacy, PBCP avoids publishing
all the contents belonging to any tuple in the sensitive set.
To derive the sensitive sets for a target user, the system assumes adversaries have access
to all the contents except for the ones of the target users. The server tests for each user all
the combinations of all the user’s contents, and discovers the sensitive sets according to the
predefined threshold by the user. Then the server records all the minimum sets that may
lead to privacy leakage. This procedure may be time-consuming. However, it can be carried
out priorly by the server as a preprocessing step. Specifically, the server can maintain the
sensitive set each time a user uploads, deletes, or modifies her contents, and notify the user
with corresponding changes.
Diverse Vectors and Covered Diverse Vectors. PBCP also maintains diverse
vectors for users. A diverse vector refers to a K0-dimensional vector with binary entries,
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denoted as Vi = {vi1, vi2, · · · , viK0}. For each user, all the corresponding entries referring to
her diverse contents are set to 1, while all the other entries are 0. For simplicity, we use the
terms diverse vector and diverse set interchangeably in this work, both of which indicate the
set of diverse contents.
Furthermore, PBCP maintains a covered diverse vector for each user, denoted as CVi =
{cvi1, cvi2, · · · , cviK0}. Each dimension of the vector has a binary entry indicating whether
the corresponding diverse content has been covered. For example, uk is similar to ui based
on the published contents, and uk also publishes c0j which is a diverse content for ui. Then
cvij = 1. All the entries for non-diverse contents are always set to 0. PBCP maintains CVi’s
to check whether a user is successfully served.
Dependent Graph. PBCP needs a data structure to record the correlations among
users, which is the dependent graph. The dependent graph indicates both the similarity and
the priorities among users. First of all, users are assigned to different levels according to
their privacy preferences. For example, the users with the most flexible preference are at
the first level, who have the highest priority. For each pair of users, there is an edge in the
dependent graph when these two users are similar. More specifically, consider two users ui
and uj:
1) When the content publication schemes for both users are not determined yet, or
either of the them is not determined, ui and uj share an edge if they are similar according
to the determined (or published) contents, or there is a feasible publication scheme making
ui and uj similar.
2) When both ui and uj determine their contents for publication, there is no edge
between them since they cannot further contribute to the coverage for each other.
Finally, two users are dependent if they share an edge in the dependent graph. Actually,
the dependent graph also provides an approach for integrating the social links among users.
For example, two users may also be considered as similar when they are friends or share
many common friends. We will consider this part in our future study.
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5.3.3 The Priority-Based Content Publishing Algorithm
The main idea of the algorithm is as follows: PBCP first ranks users according to their
priority levels, and initializes the dependent graph to record the correlations among users.
Then PBCP processes iteratively from the highest priority level to the lowest one. In each
iteration, PBCP utilizes a greedy strategy to publish contents for the users in the current
level, and updates the covered diverse sets and the dependent graph. Then PBCP checks
whether these users are served. If not, PBCP utilizes another greedy strategy to select the
users and contents from lower levels to serve the users in the current level. PBCP mainly
has two phases. The first phase initializes the sensitive sets and the diverse vectors. The
second phase iteratively determines the set of contents to be published by each user.
Parameters Initialization. In the first phase, PBCP first derives the sensitive sets
for each user. For user ui, PBCP takes all the combinations of ui’s contents as the input,
validates them in the inferring function, and derives all the minimum sensitive sets marked as
SSi = {ssi1, ssi2, · · · , ssiEi}, where each ssij is composed of a set of contents. Next, PBCP
initializes the diverse vector for each user, marked as Vi = {vi1, vi2, · · · , viK0}. vij = 1 means
c0j is the diverse content when all the contents are published. Furthermore, PBCP utilizes
the covered diverse vector CVi = {cvi1, cvi2, · · · , cviK0} for each user, where cvij indicates
whether c0j is already covered by the published contents of some users similar to ui. Initially,
all cvij’s are set to 0.
Content Publication. In the second phase, PBCP determines the sets of contents
to be published by each user. It considers the privacy issues by avoiding publishing all the
contents belonging to any tuple in a sensitive set, maintains a priority level for every user to
keep fairness, and chooses the contents to cover the diverse sets for other users. The details
of each step are as follows.
1) Parameter Update: PBCP first updates the dependent graph according to the current
published contents.
2) Current Level Publication: PBCP publishes the contents for the current priority
level. If PBCP runs for the highest priority, each user ui in this level locally determines
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the published contents. PBCP iteratively selects for each user the content appeared in the
minimum number of tuples in ui’s sensitive set, until all the contents are published, or
publishing any content will lead to the full publication of some tuples.
If PBCP runs for the remaining priority levels, it first checks for each user ui and each
tuple ssij of ui in the current level. PBCP searches for all ui’s dependent users uj’s in a
higher priority level. When all uj’s, who have a diverse content C0k appearing in ssij, already
have C0k published by other similar users, PBCP removes ssij from SSi, and marks content
C0k as not publishing. Next, PBCP locally publishes the contents for the users in the current
level, which is the same as the first scenario.
3) Subsequent Level Publication: After publishing the contents for the users in the
current level, PBCP checks whether each user is successfully served, and then publishes the
contents for those unserved users. When all the users are served, PBCP goes back to step
1) and processes the next level.
PBCP first updates the covered diverse set for each user and the dependent graph.
Furthermore, PBCP sorts the users in the current level according to the reverse order of
γ
∑
vij−
∑
cvij
DLi
, where DLi is the number of dependent users for ui in the lower priority levels.
In this case, PBCP priorly serves the users who request a smaller number of extra diverse
contents, and share more links in the dependent graph. Then for each user ui in the list,
PBCP checks whether ui achieves the ratio of diverse contents in Equation (5.3). If yes,
PBCP checks for the next user. If no, PBCP selects among the users dependent to ui for
processing. The candidate users are sorted in ascending order of Lui according to their links
in the dependent graph.
For each user uk in Lui , if uk is already similar to ui according to the published contents,
PBCP iteratively selects in Ck the uncovered diverse content for ui, until no feasible content
can be published or Ck does not have any uncovered diverse content for ui. During the
selection, PBCP again selects the contents appearing in the minimum number of tuples.
PBCP dynamically checks whether ui achieves ratio γ, and stops if so. If uk is not similar
to ui yet, PBCP runs a procedure to derive the similar contents, and then follows the same
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procedure in the first case. After the procedure in Lui , PBCP updates the covered diverse
vectors and the dependent graph.
Then PBCP checks the next unserved user in the current level, until all the users are
considered.
After checking for each user in the current priority level, PBCP goes back to step 1)
and considers the users in the next priority level.
PBCP terminates when all the users in all the priority levels have been considered. The
pseudo code of PBCP is given in Algorithm 1.
5.3.4 Algorithm for Selecting Similar Contents
PBCP has a procedure to find similar contents between two users. We propose a greedy
strategy to address it. The main idea is to iteratively search for contents appearing in the
minimum number of sensitive sets, until two users are similar. Assume the algorithm searches
for the contents of ui to make ui similar to user uj in a higher level, and there are still δ
′
contents remaining to achieve the similarity. The algorithm works as follows:
1) For all the contents in Ci which also appear in Cj, the algorithm ranks them according
to their number of appearance times in SSi.
2) The algorithm iteratively selects the contents from the beginning of the content list,
until δ′ contents are selected. When the selected contents in the kth round lead to a violation
on any tuple in SSi, the algorithm skips the current content and selects the next one. If
none of the contents are qualified, the algorithm traces back, changes the content selected
in the k − 1th round with its next content in the list, and then continues the selection.
5.4 Performance Analysis
In this section, we first analyze the time complexity of PBCP. Then we prove the fairness
and effectiveness of PBCP.
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Algorithm 1 Priority-Based Content Publishing Algorithm
1: for Each priority level do
2: Update the dependent graph via currently published contents;
3: for Each ui in current level do
4: if Priority level = highest then
5: Sorting contents according to appearance in SSi
6: while No sensitive sets are violated do
7: Publishing first content from Ci
8: end while
9: end if
10: if Priority level != highest then
11: Update SSi according to previous publication
12: Sorting contents according to appearance in SSi
13: while No sensitive sets are violated do
14: Publishing first content from Ci
15: end while
16: end if
17: end for
18: Sorting uis in current level according to
γ
∑
vij−
∑
cvij
DLi
19: for Each ui in current level do
20: if Qi < γ then
21: Sorting all users in neighbor Lui according to degree in dependent graph.
22: for All users uk in Lui do
23: if Dii′ < δ then
24: Selecting Similar Contents
25: end if
26: Sorting all uncovered contents in Ck according to appearance in SSk
27: while Qi < γ do
28: Publishing first content from Ck
29: end while
30: end for
31: end if
32: end for
33: end for
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5.4.1 Time Complexity
In the first phase, the time spent on deriving the sensitive set is O(N · 2Ki + N ·K0),
where Ki is the number of contents published by a user, and K0 is the total number of
different contents. As we see, the deriving of sensitive sets can be completed by the server
priorly, and multiple techniques can be utilized to accelerate the procedure. Therefore, this
part could sometimes be considered as a preprocessing, thus ignored. Furthermore, as each
user usually publishes a small set of contents and PBCP only looks for the minimum sensitive
set, the actual running time for the first phase could be in the order of O(N ·K0).
In the second phase, the time spent for each iteration is O(N2 ·K2max + K2max · |SS| +
N2 · K2max · |SSmax|), which is composed of three parts: updating the dependent graph,
publishing contents for the current level, and publishing contents for the subsequent levels.
Notice that during the publication in the subsequent levels, PBCP needs to update the
dependent graph and search for the similar users. For the first part, it only needs to update
the user adjacent to the selected user uk in Lui , so the time consumption is O(Ddp ·K2max),
where Ddp is the maximum degree of a user in the dependent graph. For the second part, the
time consumption is O(Kδmax), which can be solved in polynomial time as δ is a constant.
Therefore, the total running time for the second phase is O(N2 ·K2max · |SSmax|) since there
are constant levels of priorities.
Finally, the total running time for PBCP is in the order of O(N2 · |SSmax| + N ·K0),
which is determined by the number of users, the number of contents, and the size of a
sensitive set.
5.4.2 Fairness and Effectiveness
PBCP guarantees fairness among users, which means it follows all the principles in
Definition 1. We prove this in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. PBCP guarantees fairness among users.
The proof of Theorem. 4 is straightforward. We consider all the cases in our algorithm.
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First of all, PBCP guarantees that there are no contents published by high-priority
users specifically to cover the diverse contents for low-priority users, or among users with the
same priority. Meanwhile, when user uk with a lower priority does not publish any diverse
content for another ui with a higher priority, one of the following facts is true:
1) uk is not similar to ui, which means PBCP does not select uk.
2) uk is similar to ui, but has no contents belonging to the uncovered diverse content
set of ui. Then the service for ui is free from uk.
3) uk is similar to ui, and has contents belonging to the uncovered diverse content set
of ui. However, publishing any content will violate the sensitive sets. In this case, uk must
be utilized by PBCP in the previous iterations to serve the users with higher priorities than
ui.
In all the remaining cases, PBCP publishes some contents from uk belonging to the
uncovered diverse content set of ui. Therefore, PBCP follows the principles, where facts 1),
2) and 3) equal to the third, the first, and the second principles in Definition 1. Thus PBCP
guarantees fairness.
According to Theorem 4, PBCP will priorly serves users with more flexible preferences
on their privacy. This fact indicates that a user more willing to participate in the content
publication will receive more refined recommendation results in our framework, achieving a
fairness among all participants.
Now we briefly discuss the effectiveness of PBCP. As the existence of priorities could
always result in poor performance in terms of global utility, i.e., the total number of suc-
cessfully served users, it is difficult to evaluate the direct impact on the ratio of served users.
However, PBCP still tries to serve more users, while strictly following the fairness constraint.
PBCP tries to avoid the competing publication for multiple higher-priority users, and tries
to publish more contents. On the one hand, PBCP always selects the feasible users with
the minimum number of links to higher level users in the dependent graph, which means
PBCP prefers the users that only need to publish for several other users, and those users
serving more higher-level users are postponed temporarily. On the other hand, PBCP al-
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ways selects the feasible content appearing the minimum number of times in the sensitive set,
which means it tries to publish more useful contents from each user. In summary, PBCP can
achieve a better performance with more contents published, since it priorly selects the con-
tents useful for either similarity or coverage for others. Then the following theorem indicates
the effectiveness in terms of the number of published contents in PBCP.
Theorem 5. The published contents in PBCP are no less than 1
Ddp·Dss of the global maximum
one, where Ddp is the maximum degree of a user in the dependent graph, and Dss is the
maximum number of appearance times for a content in a sensitive set.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Assume each sensitive set has just two unpublished
items, which means one more content can be published from them. In the worst case, for
each target user uj, uj can locally achieve a
1
Dss
ratio of published contents compared with
the optimal result in step 2) of the second phase. When uj also utilizes the users in the
subsequent levels, uj may achieve an efficiency ratio
1
Dss
on each selected user, with totally
Ddp users. Meanwhile, when the selected user is not similar to uj, the algorithm for selecting
similar contents is utilized. As this algorithm also selects the contents with the minimum
number of appearance times in a sensitive set, it can also guarantee a 1
Dss
ratio on the total
number of published contents. Therefore, the overall efficiency ratio is 1
Ddp·Dss .
The degree of a user in the dependent graph could be relatively small when the threshold
δ for similarity inceases, and each content generally correlates with a limited size of sensitive
information. Therefore, according to Theorem 5, the ratio bound could be small in real-world
scenarios.
Finally, PBCP utilizes the existence of fairness to improve effectiveness, which removes
some tuples in the sensitive sets during the Current Level Publication. In this case, a target
user only needs to serve the users with higher priorities. Therefore, when all the users are
processed, the target user can be selfish and only concerns its own publication.
79
5.5 Discussion
In this section, we first introduce the applicability of our framework. The composition
of sensitive sets are then discussed. Furthermore, different definitions of priority levels are
discussed.
5.5.1 Extensibility of The Framework
Although our framework is designed for the one-time content publication, it could be
easily extended for the dynamic scenarios. We can periodically run the algorithm to publish
the newly uploaded contents, while preserving both existing and newly emerged sensitive in-
formation. They underlying reason is that no sensitive sets will de revealed in our framework.
The previous existing sensitive set will still be sensitive, and the newly emerged sensitive
set will not be disclosed as the new contents have not been published yet. Meanwhile, our
framework can also be extended to online social networks where users may post their ratings
in the contents. One simple extension is to consider the common publishing of contents as
the same content and similar rating for that content. In this approach, our algorithm can
be applied directly to the system, and also distinguishes between the like and the dislike.
5.5.2 Applicability of The Sensitive Set
Our definition of privacy can be utilized for multiple categories of privacy preservations,
ranging from the existence of sensitive contents to the popular differential privacy. For
example, when sensitive information is directly included in some contents, a system can
utilize our framework to extract all the sensitive contents, and a sensitive set is composed
of all such contents. As a second instance, when sensitive information is measurable, like
locations, and some contents are close to the sensitive value, a sensitive set is composed of
all the contents within a range of the sensitive value, or the combinations of such contents
can be used to improve the confidence for the existence of the sensitive value.
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Our definition of privacy can also be utilized for the attacks via inferring functions or
statistical results, where contents from all users are considered as the input. This principle
is achieved by discovering for a target user the combination of contents, the output of which
in the inferring functions or statistical results leads to the disclosure of sensitive information.
All such combinations form a sensitive set for the target user. Meanwhile, our definition is
also similar to differential privacy with the assumption that adversaries know all the contents
except for the target user. Finally, our definition of privacy could also be extended for the
attacks on binary attributes. In this case, a sensitive set could be simplified to one principle,
i.e., balance the number of published contents related to each value of the attribute.
However, our definition of privacy is limited to the number of contents generated by a
user. Even though multiple techniques like paralleling or pruning can be utilized and most
users only have moderate numbers of contents, it is still time consuming for users with a large
number of contents. Therefore, how to efficiently derive a sensitive set is still an unsolved
problem. Further study is still needed regarding this issue.
5.5.3 Priority Levels
There could be numerous definitions for priority levels. Our framework is not limited
to any specific definition. Instead, our work could actually take priority level as an input,
which mainly determines the assignment of layers in the dependent graph. Therefore, our
framework can determine priority according to privacy preference, the willingness in serving
other users, the centrality of users, the number of contents owned by users, etc.
The first two methods consider the subjective attitudes of users, which make data
publication more controllable for individuals. However, these methods may lead to poor
performance for data publication in some cases, since they are less correlated with the struc-
ture of an OSN. Furthermore, users could be unqualified in accurately determining privacy
preference, which may further limits the performance.
The third and the fourth methods take the structure of a network into consideration.
Therefore, they can achieve better performance on data publication when properly defined.
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However, priority is in fact passively determined for each user, which is based on a user’s
role in an OSN. This is sometimes considered to be inappropriate as users are the subjects
of data publication.
Generally, it is also an open problem to determine a proper priority level for each user,
which balances both user satisfaction and system performance. This is another our future
work.
5.6 Evaluation
5.6.1 System Settings
We evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm towards a real world dataset
published by Yelp [140], which is an OSN system where users share their experiences on local
businesses. More specifically, we focus on the reviewers in Charlotte, NC with more than 30
reviews. For each review, we utilize the first 3 tags in the category of the business to form a
set, which serve as the identification of the review. The tags could be ”restaurant”, ”Italian
food”, ”overnight”, etc.
We also randomly generate sensitive set SSi for each user. Firstly, the number of tuples
in SSi is achieved by multiplying the number of contents by privacy factor αj. The various
privacy factors refer to different privacy preferences. Generally, a larger αj indicates more
tuples in SSi, and also a lower priority level for the user.
We compare the proposed algorithm with a baseline local maximum publication mecha-
nism. In this mechanism, each user locally determines her published contents. A user always
selects the one that appears the minimum number of times in SSi within the remaining con-
tents, until publishing any content will lead to a total publication of at least one tuple in SSi.
Two metrics are considered: the ratio of served users and the ratio of published contents.
The first metric could directly evaluate the performance of the two algorithms, while the
second metric can evaluate the utility of knowledge in an OSN.
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5.6.2 Performance for The Whole Community
In this part, we evaluate the ratio of the successfully served users, as well as the published
contents for all users. The evaluation results could validate the general performance of the
proposed algorithm for a whole network. All users are randomly assigned with 4 priority
levels. The sensitive sets are composed of tuples each including two contents randomly picked
from a user, i.e., two contents cannot be published simultaneously. The values of α are 1,
1.5, 2, and 2.5 for each level. We further assume δ = 3, which means two users are considered
as similar when they have no fewer than three common contents. This assumption could
make a balance between the size of similar users and the recommended results. Finally, we
set γ = 0.5, which is the threshold for successful publication.
In our first group of experiments, we validate the performance with different scales of
sensitive sets. Therefore, we introduce a parameter called general privacy preference, denoted
as β. Then the sizes of sensitive sets in each level are βKi, 1.5βKi, 2βKi, and 2.5βKi, where
Ki is the number of contents for a target user. The results are shown in Fig.5.1 and Fig.5.2
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Figure 5.1. Ratio of served users under various privacy
preferences.
As we can see, PBCP can averagely serve 60% more users compared with the baseline
method. This is because when users locally publish their contents, some users cannot be
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Table 5.1. List of Notation
Notation Explanation
U = {u1, u2, · · · , uN} Set of users
Ci = {ci1, ci2, · · · , ciKi} Contents from user ui
C0 = {c01, c02, · · · , c0K0} Candidate set of contents
Iij Indicator cij is published by ui
Dii′ Common contents by ui and ui′
δ Threshold on similar users
Qi′ Ratio of recommended contents
γ Threshold for successful service
f(·) Inference function
θi Privacy Preference of ui
SSi Sensitive set for ui
Vi = {vi1, vi2, · · · , viK0} Diverse content set for ui
CVi =
{cvi1, cvi2, · · · , cviK0}
Covered diverse content set for ui
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Figure 5.2. Ratio of published contents under various privacy
preferences.
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covered since their correlated users do not cooperate. PBCP can properly utilize the corre-
lations to serve users with higher priorities. Furthermore, as the general privacy preference
increases from 0.125 to 1.5, both algorithms suffer poor performance, which is due to the
fact that constraints from the sensitive sets are over-stringent. In this case, all users tend to
be selfish on the publication, and the performance will obviously be limited. Actually, the
constraints are still tight even when the general privacy preference is relatively small. The
underlying reason is that the existence of sensitive sets limits the total number of published
contents. As a consequence, the number of diverse contents for all users is also limited.
Meanwhile, we also find in Fig.5.2 that the number of published contents is comparable with
the local maximum method, which indicates our strategy for content selection also achieves
local optimization. Therefore, our algorithm will guarantee the publication of each user,
while achieving qualified recommended results simultaneously.
The second group of experiments considers the impact of parameter γ, which is the
threshold for the successful coverage of a user. As users have different expectations on
service quality, this threshold may also vary. The general privacy preference β is 0.5, and γ
changes from 0.5 to 0.9. The results are shown in Fig.5.3 and Fig.5.4.
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Figure 5.3. Ratio of served users under various coverage
requests.
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Figure 5.4. Ratio of published contents under various coverage
requests.
As is shown, our algorithm can always outperforms the local maximum method, even if
γ = 0.9. However, the performance for both algorithms degrades significantly as γ increases.
The underlying reason is that more contents should be published for each served user, which
significantly decreases the number of published diverse contents for the remaining users. This
in turns leads to the degradation of the global performance. Furthermore, the published ratio
in Fig.5.4 also partially decreases, which means more contents are published to cover other
users, instead of the local maximum number of contents.
The third group of experiment evaluates the performance of PBCP under different
values of δ, which means users have different requests for similarity users. The threshold for
similarity ranges from 1 to 5, We set γ = 0.5 and β = 0.5. The results are shown in Fig.5.5
and Fig.5.6.
First of all, the performance of PBCP slightly upgrades as δ increases. The underlying
reason is that a larger δ leads to fewer correlations among users. Then a larger number
of users do not have diverse contents, and they are always considered to be successful.
Meanwhile, the number of published contents in PBCP also approaches that of the baseline
algorithm in Fig.5.5, which means our algorithm achieves local maximum.
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Figure 5.5. Ratio of served users under various similarity
requests.
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Figure 5.6. Ratio of published contents under various similarity
requests.
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5.6.3 Performance for Heterogeneous Users
In this part, we investigate the performance of PBCP for different users in OSNs. The
evaluation can bring knowledge on the detailed and fine-grained performance of a social
network system. Our settings are as follows: general privacy preference β = 0.5, thresholds
for coverage and similarity are γ = 0.5 and δ = 3, and the remaining settings are the same
as the previous group of experiments. We first evaluate the performance for users with
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Figure 5.7. Ratio of served users under various links.
heterogeneous links in the original dependent graph. Generally, the links in the dependent
graph refer to the number of similar users. The users are divided into groups according to
the numbers of links: [2, 4], [4, 6], [6, 8], [8, 10], [10, +∞]. We investigate in Fig.5.7 and
Fig.5.8 whether the increasing number of correlated users can lead to a higher coverage.
As shown in Fig.5.7, the performance remains approximately stable with the increase
of the number of links. It is because the number of diverse contents also increases, which
is shown in Fig.5.8. Therefore, the increase on the number of links will not significantly
contribute to the replicas of the diverse contents. It is believed that as the number of links
keeps increasing, the number of diverse contents will converge, and the performance will
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Figure 5.8. Number of diverse contents under various
links.
improve. However, the considered OSN is sparse and has a large number of contents, which
limit the appearance of the convergence.
The second evaluation considers the ratios of successful served users with different pri-
ority levels. We can observe from Fig.5.9 that PBCP serves much more users with higher
priority levels, which is twice more than that of the local maximum method for the first two
priory levels. The results indicate that PBCP can guarantee a better performance on fairness
among users. Meanwhile, PBCP achieves a comparable performance for lower priority levels.
One reason is that when a user publishes and covers diverse contents for high-priority users,
a high-priority user may also in return contribute to the coverage for low-priority users.
The last evaluation considers users with different number of contents, and the results
are presented in Fig.5.10 and Fig.5.11. The users are divided into groups by the number of
contents: [30, 39], [40, 49], [50, 59], [60, 69], [70, +∞]. As we can see in Fig.5.10, the ratio
of the served users changes slightly among different groups of users. In this case, although
the increase of the number of contents can provide more correlated users, it also causes the
increase of the number of diverse contents. As all users in each group are diverse in their
priorities, the ratio of the served users will not be significantly changed.
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Figure 5.9. Ratio of served users with different priorities.
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Figure 5.10. Ratio of served users under various contents.
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Figure 5.11. Number of diverse contents under various contents.
5.7 Summary
As the scale of OSNs keeps growing, the threats and the concerns on sensitive informa-
tion are more pervasive than ever, which severely thwarts the participation of users as well as
limits the promotion of OSN-based services. This chapter considers a novel problem where
users in OSNs publish their contents for services like content-based recommendation consid-
ering both privacy and fairness. A novel framework is proposed, where the privacy concern is
presented as a series of sensitive sets, and users are served according to their priority levels.
Then a corresponding algorithm is proposed to determine the contents to be published for
each user, which also strictly follows the constraints for privacy preservation and guarantees
fairness among users. The theoretical analysis is performed to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the algorithm, and the evaluations towards a real-world dataset are carried out to validate
the performance of the algorithm. We will consider how to integrate the social links into our
framework in future work, which is also an essential part of online social networks.
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Chapter 6
COOPERATIVE LOCATION-PRIVACY-AWARE REVIEW DATA
PUBLICATION
6.1 Motivation
The ubiquitous usage of smart phones brings remarkable benefits to our daily life. The
location-based service, as one of the numerous new features implemented on mobile devices,
has been an integral part of our everyday life [160]. Local business service systems provide
location-based services, which can efficiently help us gather information from a local area. A
local business service system is an important component of a Location-Based Social Network
(LBSN) [161]. Some examples are Yelp, Tripadvisor, Dianping and Facebook. They are now
dominating the way in which many people choose their entertainment and dining places [131].
In these systems, users voluntarily publish their locations and reviews to build reputations
for businesses or Points of Interests (PoIs) [162]. The review lists for businesses are built in a
crowdsourced manner and users act as both service creators and consumers [163]. However,
as creators, they are taking the risk of significant privacy leakage since a user reveals her
visited location each time she publishes a review. As we know, the location is the inherently
public information for a PoI. This may possibly expose her sensitive profile like working area
or favorite entertainment area, or even a potential change in life when she submits some
reviews for businesses in unfamiliar areas. In this chapter, we investigate how to maintain
meaningful review lists for businesses while preserving location privacy for users.
In this scenario, the system providers (i.e., the founders of Yelp or Trip advisor) are
assumed to be trustable since they usually achieve an agreement on the privacy policy with
users. Furthermore, they help users thwart attacks from business rivals as well as malicious
attackers. The adversaries could be either unauthentic enterprises or individuals who can
read or collect the user profiles from the website. They intend to learn the frequently visited
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areas of targeted users based on their published reviews, which can be used for attacks
such as further inference on other sensitive information, physical stalking, etc. Preserving
location privacy is quite challenging in these systems. The first reason is that locations are
always revealed when users publish new reviews. A business always discloses its location to
guide interested users, while it accordingly indicates that the owner of each review has once
visited this location. Then a user leaks her frequent visits if she publishes many reviews
about the businesses in the same area. Secondly, attacks may happen in both arbitrary and
multiple areas, while the existing works mostly focus on users’ location privacy on sensitive
PoIs, unit regions, or continuous regions [164]. For example, a dealer has several retail
stores located in different parts of a city and plans to send out advertisements. It can crawl
public reviews from the system and target the group of users who frequently visit any of its
stores’ nearby area. In this case, the interested area is often sporadic. Furthermore, multiple
adversaries often have heterogeneous interested areas. This leads to the attacks on multiple
granularities and complicated combination of area. A third reason is that the users act as
essential roles in building LBSS, especially those active users. Preserving their privacy is
also a critical precondition to retain them and thus guaranteeing the normal evolution of
the system. Thus a location privacy preserving mechanism running by the system providers
must settle all challenges to avoid the disclosure of users’ privacy information.
Considering these challenges, the existing mechanisms on location privacy are incapable.
Previous study on location privacy preservation utilizes techniques like location coarsening,
faking, blocking, k-anonymity, differential privacy and so on [41] [44] [20]. The location
coarsening, faking and blocking techniques change the location to a coarse granularity, or
replace it with a nearby location, or simply hide the location information. They are infeasible
in our framework since the locations of the POIs are always public and accurate. Each
review surely leaks the visited location for the user. The k-anonymity-based techniques are
also not applicable since every review is tied to a user. Obfuscating the time of a review
is technically feasible since the sensitivity of a visited location gradually decreases with
time. The advantage of such techniques is that all the reviews can be public. However, it
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suffers from the loss of confidence and usefulness of reviews and also limits the presentation
of user activeness, i.e., user’s are not willing to mark their latest publication to an older
date. Considering that adversaries usually make a binary decision on the frequent visiting
area of a user, the differential privacy [165] is also incapable since it mainly preserves the
sensitive information from a relative indistinguishability aspect. One feasible solution is
partial publishing, where users only publish a subset of their reviews. However, it potentially
limits system utility due to the lack of published reviews for some businesses. In this chapter,
a mechanism in the intermediate point between totally and partially publishing is utilized,
i.e., all reviews are published while some of them are anonymous. It can significantly mitigate
utility loss, even though the anonymous reviews seem less trustworthy.
Besides the privacy issue on the exposure of sensitive mobility patterns, the system
providers should also maintain the utility of their systems. System utility is usually defined
by two categories. On the system provider side, the service providers must keep the reviews
of each business capable to support users’ decisions. It requires the publishing of highly
approved reviews, for example, those published recently or marked many times as useful or
cool in Yelp. Meanwhile, since the anonymous reviews are likely to be submitted by disloyal
users [166], system providers should also keep many of highly approved reviews public. On
the user side, they also hope to publish as many reviews as possible, especially those highly
supported by viewers. Furthermore, reviews are from different users. Letting each user set
his reviews public or anonymous individually could lead to a poor utility. They may possibly
set anonymous reviews to the same businesses. It stresses again that the system providers
take the charge to maintain both the utility of their systems and user privacy.
As a consequence, this chapter investigates the review publishing mechanism consid-
ering users’ location privacy. Our objective is to maximize the number of businesses with
abundant highly-approved public reviews and maintain a good profile for each user, while
also preserving the location privacy for users in arbitrary area. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study on review publishing considering system utility, personal profile and
privacy in multiple regions.
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Our mechanism protects users’ location privacy on multi-granularities of area. All busi-
nesses are clustered into many unit regions according to their distance between each other.
Each unit region may physically refer to the business area or residential area in the real
world. We set the number of public reviews for PoIs in every unit region below some thresh-
old for each user, which limits the confidence of user’s frequent appearance. Meanwhile, the
mechanism also preserves location privacy in a combination of unit regions. In this case, an
adversary concerns whether a user frequently appears in some part of this mixed subregion.
The corresponding threshold of public reviews in the mixed subregion is larger than anyone
of its single unit region, but less than the summed threshold of all the contained unit regions.
The first constraint is straightforward since a larger region allows users to set more reviews
public. For the second constraint, notice that as the number of public reviews approaches the
threshold, the confidence that this user frequently appears in the unit region also increases.
Then the user may frequently appear in every part of the mixed subregion when we set the
threshold to be identical with the summation. Considering that such a conclusion is actually
overstrict, the threshold should be less than the summation of its unit regions.
To define system utility, our mechanism employs the (, δ)-public principle. It indicates
the review list for a business which can support the reviewer’s decision when  out of top δ
useful reviews are public. This is based on the fact that a user usually only checks the first
several reviews. Bounding the number of anonymous reviews can guarantee the reliability
of the list. The mechanism tries to maximize the number of businesses following the (, δ)-
public principle. After building the review lists for businesses, there may be some budgets
left for some users. In this case, the mechanism tries to publish a maximal number of reviews
for each user.
Actually, to maximize the number of (, δ)-public businesses while following the thresh-
old in a set of mixed subregions is often complicated. We show that this problem is NP-hard.
Then we propose a heuristic algorithm and validate its effectiveness through experiments.
The contributions are summarized as follows:
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• We propose novel definitions for utility and privacy in crowd-sourced local businesses
service systems, which are more proper for real world scenarios.
• We formulate the problem of maximizing (, δ)-public businesses in our system model,
and prove this problem to be NP-hard.
• We propose two heuristics to build the review lists for businesses and users, and they
can determine the public or anonymous status for all the reviews.
• We validate the performances of our algorithms through extensive experiments towards
real-world data set.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The investigated problem is
formulated in Section II. Section III presents the privacy issue and our algorithms for review
status decision and privacy protection. Some discussions are given in Section IV. Section V
shows the experiment results. We conclude the chapter in Section VI.
6.2 Model and Design Goals
In this section, we formalize our problem and the adversary model, and identify the
design object.
6.2.1 Privacy Preservation Procedure in LBSS
Generally, in our framework, the privacy preservation procedure works as follow in a
typical local business service systems: The system providers first observe the potential set
of area monitored by attackers or malicious users, and send notifications to all users. The
notification may include the subset of area related to a user, as well as some recommendation
on how to publish reviews in these area, e.g., the thresholds. The user receives the notification
and returns feedbacks like ignoring the notification, following the recommended setting,
or providing another unique setting. The system providers collect the response from all
users, centrally assign the public and anonymous status for each review, and send back the
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assignment to each user. After the users check the results, the providers update the status
for each review for all users. Our work focuses on the centralized assignment of reviews in
the framework, which acts as a core role of whole processing.
6.2.2 System Model
In a local business service system, there are M businesses located in a city area Λ,
denoted as {L1, L2, · · · , LM}. Each business Li has a unique location denoted by coordinate
(xi, yi), which is often the longitude and latitude. There are N users {u1, u2, u3, · · · , uN}
in the system. Each user has reviews on multiple businesses including the ratings and
comments.
Review rij refers to the rank of the review of user uj for business Li. rij = k means
uj’s review for Li is the kth most useful one, and rij = −1 means user uj has no review on
Li. There are several mechanisms to determine the usefulness of a review. In this chapter,
we define it as the number of other users who agree with it. Each time a new user clicks on
the ”useful” or ”cool” button, the usefulness of the review increases by one. In our problem,
some reviews are anonymous due to privacy consideration. pij is an indicator for review rij.
pij = 0 means rij is anonymous and pij = 1 means the user id of rij is public.
The whole region is composed of many disjoint unit regions {ur1, ur2, · · · , urP}. A
unit region refers to a geographically closing area, like several nearby blocks or plazas.
Each business belongs to one unit region. Meanwhile, there is a set of mixed subregions
A = {A1, A2, · · · , AK}. Each mixed subregion Ai includes a set of unit regions. The mixed
subregions are the set of interested areas monitored by adversaries. Each mixed subregion
(subregion for short) can be a unit region, or the combination of nearby or sporadic unit
regions. Subregions are heterogeneous in both the number of involved unit regions and the
way they are generated. All the subregions are different and a subregion could be included
by another one. For simplicity, we assume each unit region is within the subregion set A.
The derivation of subregions will be discussed in Section IV.
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6.2.3 Adversary and Utility Model
The adversaries are honest-but-curious. They simply collect all the public data that
they can access. Attackers may infer the frequently visited subregions of each user. There
is a threshold for each subregion. A user is very likely to visit a subregion frequently when
the number of her public reviews for this subregion exceeds the threshold. To preserve user
privacy, the number of the public reviews of a user for a subregion should be bounded. In
our system, the threshold is also called the budget for the users. It is denoted by function
f(A0), where A0 is an arbitrary subregion. It means the number of the public reviews for the
businesses located in A0 must not be larger than f(A0) for each user. Function f(·) should
follow the constraints shown below.
(1) f(·) ∈ N+;
(2) ∀Ai, Aj, if Aj ⊂ Ai, then f(Ai) > f(Aj);
(3) If Ai = Ai1 ∪Ai2 ∪ · · · ∪Aik , where Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aik are subregions in A, then f(Ai) <∑ik
j=i1
f(Aj).
Constraint (1) means users can always publish some of their reviews safely. Constraint
(2) assures that a larger area allows users to publish more reviews. Constraint (3) makes
a reduction on the budget to hide frequent appearance of users in some part of the mixed
subregion, which is also introduced in the first section.
Let Rij be the number of user uj’s public reviews for subregion Ai. Then uj’s privacy
is preserved when ∀Ai ∈ A,Rij ≤ f(Ai).
The utility of the system is defined in two folds, the review lists for businesses and
for users. For each business, the system should pay attention to its first few reviews since
most users only read the top-ranked reviews. Meanwhile, the anonymous reviews are less
trustable. They are more likely to be published and supported by dishonest users. Then the
number of anonymous reviews for each business should be bounded. To address this issue,
we define the (, δ)-public principle as follows.
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Definition 3. Business Li follows the (, δ)-public principle if
1) all the reviews are public when the number of the reviews for Li is less than δ;
2) at least  out of top-δ useful reviews are public when the number of the reviews for Li
is no less than δ.
The first part of the utility of the system is defined as the number of businesses following
the (, δ)-public principle, and these businesses are successfully published. We denote reviews
that can contribute to the (, δ)-public principle as the core reviews.
For the second part, a user hopes to set as many useful reviews to be public as possible.
Then the second part of the utility is defined as the total number of public reviews for all
users. Finally, let Ci denote the number of the public reviews for Li, Di be the number of
the public reviews of user ui, and Ii be an indicator for the successful publication of Li.
6.2.4 Design Object
The object of this framework also has two folds. First, the system should maximize
the number of the businesses following the (, δ)-public principle while violating none of the
budget constraints for all users. This object is formalized as follows.
max
M∑
m=1
Im (6.1)
s.t. R′ij < f(Ai), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K},∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} (6.2)
Im ∈ {0, 1}, ∀m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M} (6.3)
Cm ≥ , ∀m ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}, Im = 1 (6.4)
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Table 6.1. List of Notation
Notation Explanation
{L1, L2, · · · , LM} Set of POIs
(xi, yi) Coordinates of POI Li
{u1, u2, u3, · · · , uN} Set of users
rij Rank of review of user uj for POI Li
pij Indicator of anonymity of review rij
{ur1, ur2, · · · , urP} Set of unit regions
A = {A1, A2, · · · , AK} Set of interested mixed subregions
f(·) Privacy sensitive function
Rij User uj’s public reviews in subregion
Ai
Ci Number of public reviews for Li
Di Number of public reviews for ui
Ii Indicator for the successful publish of
Li
Second, after the procedure for the first object, the system should use the remaining budgets
to maximize the number of the public reviews for all users. This problem is shown below.
max
N∑
n=1
(Di −D′i) (6.5)
s.t. Rij −R′ij < f(Ai)−R′ij ∀i ∈ 1 to K,∀j ∈ 1 to N, (6.6)
where D′i and R
′
ij refer to the corresponding numbers of reviews published for the first object.
6.3 The Framework for Review Publishing
In this section, we first show the exposure of location privacy in current system settings.
Then we analyze the complexity of the problem. We introduce our algorithms for two objects
in part C and part D, and discuss the subregions and budget function in part E.
6.3.1 Exposure of Location Privacy
The location privacy for a user will be exposed in a local business service system if there
is no preservation. Taking the yelp data set [140] as an example. We randomly picked two
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Figure 6.1. Location information of users’ reviews in Pittsburgh, PA.
people in Pittsburgh, PA and plotted the location information of their reviews in Fig.6.1.
In Fig 1, x-axis refers to the longitude while y-axis refers to the latitude. As we see, both
users have several frequently visited grids, and they have significantly different patterns. For
example, User 1 often appears in the upper part of the middle region while User 2 tends to
visit the lower part of the middle region. Adversaries can gain more knowledge by analyzing
the businesses or PoIs inside each grid, and then infer further detailed information about the
user. Therefore, under the current system settings, the sensitive information of many users
may be exposed.
6.3.2 Complexity of The Problem
We consider a special case of our problem. Assume there is only one user in the system,
i.e., N = 1. There is only one business within each unit region, and the user has one review
for each business. The mixed subregion set includes all the unit regions and some pairwise
unit region sets. f(·) = 1, which means only one review can be public in a subregion.
Then achieving the first object is itself an NP-hard problem. i.e., maximizing the number
of successfully published businesses is the same as the maximum independent set problem
in graphs, where each unit region is a vertex, and two unit regions share an edge when
101
they appear in one subregion. Thus, the complexity of the whole problem is NP-hard.
Furthermore, there can be a huge number of unit regions in a large city, so achieving the
optimal solution could be time consuming. Next, we introduce the design of our heuristic
algorithm for each object.
6.3.3 Maintaining Review Lists for Businesses
There are two objects in our framework. We consider the review lists for businesses
first since they determine users’ choice, which is the core utility of LBSS. Meanwhile, users
always hope their reviews to be noticed by more people, so the first object also publishes
reviews contributing to users’ reputation. Our first algorithm, called Business Review
list Building algorithm (BRB for short), handles the first object. It only considers the
core reviews contributing to the list for businesses, i.e., first δ reviews of a business or all
reviews when the number of reviews is less than δ.
The basic idea of BRB is to preferentially set public those reviews sharing the budget
with fewer other reviews, i.e., those reviews from users who have less total reviews in a
subregion. Publishing them results in fewer anonymous reviews. Meanwhile, BRB also
alleviates the budget consumption by removing reviews whose belonging businesses achieve
the (, δ)-public principle. For clarity, we introduce the following notations.
Definition 4. The Budget Consumption of review rij, denoted as BCij, is the maximum
difference between the number of non-determined reviews and the remaining budget among
all the subregions including business Li.
BCij = maxLi∈Ak{Tjk − f(Ak)}, (6.7)
where Tjk is the number of non-determined reviews submitted by uj for subregion Ak. The
term ”non-determined” means the status of the review has not decided in BRB.
Definition 5. The Business Budget Consumption of business Li, denoted as BBCi, is
the minimum total budget consumption that the business still requires to achieve the (, δ)-
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public principle.
BBCi =
k∑
j=1
BCij, (6.8)
where uj owns the review with the jth minimum budget consumption for Li, and k = −Ci.
To calculate the budget consumption for each review rij, BRB scans all the subregions
containing Li and maintains the remaining budget and non-determine reviews for user uj
in each subregion. The business budget consumption can be directly derived from budget
consumptions. BRB mainly includes two phases.
Phase 1: the algorithm publishes all reviews with negative or zero budget consump-
tion. Publishing them does not affect the status of other reviews for a single user. The
underlying reason is straightforward. Consider any other review ri′j sharing one or more
common subregions with rij:
1) When it also has a budget less than zero, the algorithm can still set it to be public.
2) When it has a budget larger than zero, which is determined by subregion Ak, rij must not
appear in this subregion. Otherwise, rij also has a budget consumption larger than zero. In
this case, publishing rij does not change the budget of user uj in subregion Ak, so it does
not impact ri′j’s status.
Phase 2: the algorithm repeats the following procedure until there are no reviews
left or no budget for the non-determined reviews:
(i) Select review rij with the minimum BCij;
(ii) Check whether uj has a positive budget for all the subregions including Li;
(iii) If yes, set pij = 1. Otherwise, go to step (i) and select the next review;
(iv) Update the budget for user uj and Ci for Li. Remove all the non-determined reviews
for Li when Ci =  or Ci equals the number of the reviews for Li;
After Phase 2, BRB sets all the remaining reviews to be anonymous and stops.
In Step (i) of Phase 2, BRB further filters reviews with the following conditions one by
one when multiple reviews have a common budget consumption.
C1: Select review rij with the minimum BBCi/(− Ci);
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C2: Select review rij with the minimum BBCi;
C3: Select the review rij with the highest rank;
The underlying purpose of BRB in Step (i) of Phase 2 is to preferentially retain the
budget shared by many reviews, i.e., the reviews with large BCs. The reason is straightfor-
ward. The BC refers to the budget deficit for a set of reviews. A large BC results in more
anonymous reviews. Considering the fact that some reviews could be removed in Step (iv) of
Phase 2 by publishing other reviews with small budget deficit, publishing them in advance
causes unnecessary consumption of budget. As a result, BRB would be likely to suffer more
waste on budget when it considers reviews with larger BC first.
The complementary conditions C1 and C2 have the similar purposes. For condition C1,
BRB prefers the business with smaller average budget consumption, following the same idea
with the main filtering condition in Step (i). For condition C2, BRB chooses the business
with less total budget consumption, which refers to a smaller number of total anonymous
reviews. For condition C3, the reason is that higher ranking reviews intuitively contribute
more to the review lists.
The approximation ratio of the BRB algorithm is 1

. The sketch of the proof is as
follow. Assume the review list for business Li is successfully published by BRB. If Li does
not exist in the optimal solutions, it will costs at most  reduction on the published businesses,
when reviews of Li could be replaced by reviews from  different business. If Li also exists
in the optimal solutions, it has at most min{δ − , } reviews that are different from the
optimal solution. This leads to at most min{δ− , } reduction on the successfully published
businesses, Therefore, the total successful business in the optimal solution is no more than
max{,min{δ − , }} =  times of BRB. Then the approximation ratio for BRB is 1

.
Finally, the time complexity of BRB is analyzed as follow. The algorithm has O(δ ·M)
rounds. In each round, BRB calculates the budget consumption for all the non-determined
reviews. The time for each review is correlated to the number of interested area it is located
in. In the worst case, it is O(K). Determining the business budget consumption for a
business takes constant time since we have already calculated the budget consumption for
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each review. As a whole, the time complexity of BRB is O(M2K). The pseudo code of BRB
is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 Business Review List Building
1: ReviewPool ← all review rijs;
2: Calculate BC for all rijs;
3: for each review rij do
4: if BCij <= 0 then
5: pij = 1;
6: Remove rij from ReviewPool ;
7: end if
8: end for
9: while ReviewPool 6= φ do
10: PublicList ← all rij’s with the minimum BCij
11: if PublicList.size()>1 then
12: Retain rij with the minimum BBCi/(− Ci) in PublicList ;
13: if PublicList.size()>1 then
14: Retain rij with the minimum BBCi in PublicList ;
15: if PublicList.size()>1 then
16: Retain rij with the highest ranking in PublicList ;
17: end if
18: end if
19: end if
20: pij = 1; //rij is the first review in PublicList
21: Remove rij from ReviewPool ;
22: if business Li achieves the (, δ)-public principle then
23: Remove all Li’s reviews from ReviewPool ;
24: end if
25: Update budget and BC for remaining rijs
26: if rij has a non-positive budget in some subregion then
27: Remove rij from ReviewPool ;
28: end if
29: end while
6.3.4 Maintaining Review Lists for Users
The object of BRB is to build the review lists for businesses, so it only considers the
reviews for the (, δ)-public principle. After running BRB, there may still be some budget
left, and the status of some reviews are not determined yet. We then propose a second
algorithm to build the review list for each user with the remaining budget. We call this
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algorithm User Review list Building algorithm (URB for short). The object of URB
is to set public the reviews with high usefulness. URB iteratively selects the node with the
minimum degree in the maximal independent set problem. It has two phases.
In the first phase, URB first considers the reviews removed by BRB in Step(iv) of Phase
2. Some of their status are not determined since they are removed when the building of the
corresponding review lists already succeeded. In this phase, the degree of each review is
defined as the number of the subregions covering the corresponding business. URB itera-
tively chooses the one with the smallest degree and positive budget on all the corresponding
subregions. When multiple reviews tie, it selects the one with a higher ranking. Phase 1 sets
the selected reviews to be public, maintains the remaining budget and budget consumption,
and terminates when there is no reviews or budget left.
In the second phase, URB considers all the remaining reviews. The reviews with high
usefulness are preferred since they contribute more to users’ reputation. It also utilize the
same condition of the first phase as a supplementary filter.
URB keeps processing for all users until either there are no reviews left or all reviews
have at least one corresponding subregion with budget being zero. URB has O(N) rounds
for all users. In each round, it runs O(M) times, and each time it takes O(MK) to find the
best reviews. Therefore, the time complexity of URB is O(NM2K).
6.3.5 Interested Subregions and Budge Function f(·)
To support the algorithm, two components, subregion set A and budget function f(·),
need to be determined. Determining A requires two steps: deriving unit regions and deriving
subregions.
Unit Regions. Unit regions can be derived by three types of strategies: grid partition,
clustering partition, and manual partition.
Grid partition divides the whole region into equal-sized grids. It is a good choice since
the underlying city map is naturally divided by roads and streets. However, this method
potentially divide some large areas into multiple grids. In this case, a consecutive region
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appears in more than one grid. To define location privacy separately in each grid is imprac-
tical.
Clustering partition can find the inherent closeness among businesses, and it is also easy
to implement since businesses form a regular planar graph. On the other hand, it suffers
from its own drawbacks [167]. For instance, many clustering algorithms require the input
of the number of the clusters, which is hard to be estimated in a large city. Furthermore,
clustering partition may be time consuming with many businesses in a city.
The advantage of manual partition is that people have knowledge on businesses and
streets. They can partition an area more accurately. However, it suffers from subjective
effect as people may have limited knowledge on an area. To achieve a reasonable partition
is a human resource consuming task.
Our framework employs grid partition. The introduction of subregions can partially
mitigate the breaking of large regions.
Subregions. The interested subregions can be generated in two ways. The first way
is hierarchal, where each subregion is a combination of nearby unit regions and smaller sub-
regions. It may incur attacks on consecutive regions, like downtown area, luxury residential
area. The second way is to combine disjoint unit regions. For example, a dealer has several
stores in different unit regions, and it can infer users who frequently visit some of these unit
regions and send advertisements.
Budget Function. Budget function f(·) indicates the likeliness of user’s appearance in
a subregion. When the number of appearances exceeds f(·), adversaries have high confidence
in asserting the frequent appearance of a user. The design of f(·) includes two aspects: the
budget for unit regions and the budget for composite subregions.
For a unit region, the budget is directly correlated with either the number of the busi-
nesses or the number of the reviews in the unit region. People tend to visit large and popular
areas, even though they are not true frequent visitors who spend a majority of their leisure
time there. Compared with other less popular areas, their location privacy is less sensitive
when publishing the same number of reviews. Therefore, the budget for a unit region in-
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creases with the popularity of the region. In our validation part, we generally set the budget
according to the number of the businesses in a unit region.
For a composite subregion, the budget can vary from the summation of all its involved
unit regions to an arbitrarily small one. It is correlated with the location privacy of a
composite subregion. When the budget approaches its upper bound, the corresponding
privacy issue is that the user frequently visits every part of the subregion. Meanwhile, the
privacy issue changes to frequent appearances in some parts of the subregion as the budget
decreases. They refer to strategies against different types of adversaries. The smaller the
budget, the more conservative our framework is. In our framework, we assume adversaries
follow the later case, and set the budget to be smaller than the summation.
6.4 Discussion
This section discusses usefulness and applicability of our framework.
6.4.1 Usefulness of Reviews
In our framework, the usefulness of a review is mainly determined by the number of
the received ”useful” and ”cool” clicks. However, other factors like publishing time, user
authority, content in the comment also affect usefulness [168] [169]. For instance, Yelp
mainly ranks the reviews according to their publishing time, while Facebook considers both
the number of supporters and publishing time. Furthermore, they both support some user-
defined ranking methods. Our work is adaptive to all the usefulness ranking methods. It
takes the ranking result as the system input.
6.4.2 Maintaining System Evolvement
A local business service system is dynamic. New users, new businesses, and new reviews
emerge everyday in a system. The usefulness of a review also changes with users’ actions. Our
framework is still effective in this scenario. The only necessary modification is the adjustment
of the privacy sensitivity of reviews. In our framework, all reviews are identically treated.
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Table 6.2. Statistic for each city
# Busi-
nesses
# Users # Re-
views
Pittsburgh,
PA
3,041 17,799 66,116
Edinburgh,
EDH
2,971 3,098 22,957
Waterloo,
QC
3,921 13,861 49,484
Charlotte,
NC
4,963 24,224 95,749
Madison,
WI
2,307 11,691 43,690
In general, the privacy sensitivity of a review often gradually decreases by time, and it takes
less budget than before. Then we can periodically run our algorithms since there is always
budget released. Another solution is to check the budget for a user each time she submits a
new review. The new review can be published when there is sufficient budget. Otherwise,
it is set to be anonymous, or the system warns the user about the potential privacy leakage
and lets the user make the decision. Furthermore, the system can set previous anonymous
reviews to be public when the budget becomes sufficient. As a whole, by taking time into
consideration, our framework is effective in face of new users, new businesses, new reviews,
reviews ranking alterations, etc.
6.5 Evaluation
6.5.1 Experiment Settings
We evaluate our framework on the 6th round Yelp dataset [140]. It includes the busi-
ness, user and review information in ten cities across four countries. We use the data from
Pittsburgh, PA, Edinburgh, EDH, Waterloo, QC, Charlotte, NC, and Madison, WI. The
statistic for each city is shown in Table 6.2.
We compare our algorithm with a localized heuristic algorithm. The baseline algorithm
iteratively selects reviews for each user independently until there is no budget left. The
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selection first happens on core reviews, and then on the remaining reviews. The algorithm
achieves a maximum utility for every user within the budget, and it also preserves location
privacy for users. The evaluation metrics are the total number of successful businesses and
the number of public reviews in core review list and general list.
In the remaining of this section, Part B investigates the basic performance of our frame-
work; Parts C and D evaluate the performance for different users and businesses separately.
6.5.2 Basic Performance
Each city is partitioned into 5*5 grids, and the interested subregions include all the
unit regions and 24 pairwise subregions. They are (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), · · · , (24, 25). Other
settings are  = 8, δ = 10, the total budget ranges from 60 to 130, and the budget for each
unit region is determined by the number of its involved businesses. The budget of other
subregions decreases by 10%.
Fig.6.2 shows the results in five cities. As we can see, our framework significantly
increases the number of successfully published businesses. The performance of our framework
is twice better than that of the baseline method. Even with a budget of 60, our framework
can limit the ratio of failure businesses to 25% in most cities. Only less than 10% businesses
suffer untrustful review lists when the total budget is set to be 130. Notice that the total
budget is around 100, and it is partitioned by 25 unit regions. Then the budget for each
unit region is relatively small. As a whole, the true privacy leakage in each subregion under
these budgets is acceptable, which indicates our budget setting is reasonable.
Two cities with abnormal performances are Madison, WI in Fig.6.2(d) and Edinburgh,
EDH in Fig.6.2(e). The failure ratio for Madison, WI is around 5% when the budget equals
130. It indicates that many active users contribute to the review lists for businesses in
multiple unit regions, so it is possible to make full use of everyone’s budget. On the other
hand, the performance of Edinburgh, EDH is poor. There are still 50% failed businesses in
the baseline method even when the budget is 130. Our framework can reduce it to 27.2%,
which is still a large ratio. This is due to the following fact. In Edinburgh, EDH, only 3,098
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users contribute 15752 core reviews, and the ratio is 5.1. The same ratios in the other cities
are 1.21, 1.81,1.43 and 1.38. Then in Edinburgh, EDH, each user needs to publish more
reviews while their budgets are not increased, so there are much more failed businesses.
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Figure 6.2. The ratio of failed businesses with different total budgets.
The numbers of public core reviews and general public reviews are shown in Fig.6.3. As
can be seen, the performance is consistent with the result shown in Fig.6.2. Our framework
can publish 80% both core reviews and general reviews, so it has a good performance for
both objects defined in Section III.
In Fig.6.3, we also find that the numbers of public reviews increase slowly. The reason
is that most users have few reviews in most unit regions and many reviews in several unit
regions. Increasing the budget does not affect the performance in most unit regions, and the
newly assigned budget for the remaining unit region is relatively small. Then the number of
the new published reviews is smaller compared with the existing ones. Meanwhile, we notice
that the performance of Edinburgh, EDH is different from the other cities. The underlying
reason is similar with the performance shown in Fig.6.2.
111
5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 3 0 1 4 01 5 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
3 5 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
4 5 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
5 5 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
6 5 0 0 0
 
 
G l o b a l  B u d g e t
P u b l i c  c o r e  r e v i e w s P u b l i c  r e v i e w s T o t a l  c o r e  r e v i e w sT o t a l  r e v i e w s
(a) Pittsburgh, PA
5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 3 0 1 4 02 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
3 5 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
4 5 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
5 5 0 0 0
 
 
G l o b a l  B u d g e t
 P u b l i c  c o r e  r e v i e w s P u b l i c  r e v i e w s T o t a l  c o r e  r e v i e w s T o t a l  r e v i e w s
(b) Waterloo, QC
5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 3 0 1 4 02 5 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
3 5 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
4 5 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
5 5 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
6 5 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
7 5 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
8 5 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
9 5 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
 
 
G l o b a l  B u d g e t
 P u b l i c  c o r e  r e v i e w s P u b l i c  r e v i e w s T o t a l  c o r e  r e v i e w s T o t a l  r e v i e w s
(c) Charlotte, NC
5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 3 0 1 4 0
1 5 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
3 5 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
4 5 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
 
 
G l o b a l  B u d g e t
 P u b l i c  c o r e  r e v i e w s P u b l i c  r e v i e w s T o t a l  c o r e  r e v i e w s T o t a l  r e v i e w s
(d) Madison, WI
5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 3 0 1 4 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 5 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0
 
 
G l o b a l  B u d g e t
 P u b l i c  c o r e  r e v i e w s P u b l i c  r e v i e w s T o t a l  c o r e  r e v i e w s T o t a l  r e v i e w s
(e) Edinburgh, EDH
Figure 6.3. The public ratio for core and general reviews with different total budgets.
As we know, one of the challenges is that adversaries may attack users in subregions
instead of the whole area. Users are vulnerable since they tend to appear in a small number
of subregions, so their truly available budget is only the budget for those unit regions they
visited. To validate the performance of our framework, we run our algorithm in a special
case, where adversaries only attack users at a whole city level. We use Pittsburgh, PA as
an example. The result is shown in Fig.6.4. As we see, the ratio of failed business is only
357/3041 = 11.7% even when the budget is only 40. On the other hand, the ratio for the
baseline algorithm is still 887/3041 = 29.2%. The result shows that our framework can
properly maintain the review lists for businesses.
6.5.3 Utility for Users
We analyze the utility for different types of users below. We partition Pittsburgh, PA
into 5*5 grids, and the interested subregions include all the unit regions and 24 pairwise
subregions (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), · · · , (24, 25). The total budget is 70,  = 8, and δ = 10. The
budget is allocated according to the number of businesses.
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Figure 6.4. The number of failed businesses with different total
budgets in a single-region area.
Fig.6.5(a) shows the number of users in each group. We find that the majority of
users have fewer than 10 reviews. This is true since most users only check the local business
service systems for information, and they have no interests in publishing their own comments.
Fig.6.5(b) is the ratio of public reviews. Most of the groups achieve a good utility, except for
those most active users. Meanwhile, even for the group of users with fewer than 10 reviews,
the public ratio is less than 1. One reason is that users only visit a small part of a city. Then
the budget for this part is insufficient even though there are only several reviews. Finally,
for the active user group, the ratio is just around 0.5. It indicates these users suffer severe
privacy leakage in existing systems, where they simply publish all reviews.
6.5.4 Utility for Businesses
In this part, we investigate the utility for different types of businesses. The businesses
are grouped by the number of reviews and business density of their unit regions. The setting
of our framework is the same as Part C.
Fig.6.6 shows the number of businesses with different numbers of reviews. The distribu-
tion is similar with that of users. More than half of businesses receive fewer than 10 reviews,
113
1 6 6 9 6
6 4 21 6 39 55 01 5 3
o t h e r < 5 0 < 4 0 < 3 0 < 2 0 < 1 00
1 0 0 0 0
 nu
mb
er o
f us
er
 
 
r e v i e w  p e r  u s e r
(a) Distribution of users based on review
number
o t h e r < 5 0 < 4 0 < 3 0 < 2 0 < 1 00 . 0
0 . 2
0 . 4
0 . 6
0 . 8
1 . 0
1 . 2
 pu
blic
 rat
io
 c o r e  r e v i e w s r e v i e w s
 
 
r e v i e w  p e r  u s e r
(b) Public ratio
Figure 6.5. Performance among different groups of users.
and only a few of those popular businesses like some restaurants receive many comments.
Based on the results shown in Fig.6.7(a) and Fig.6.7(b), our framework has a consistent
performance on all the groups. Both the success ratio and the public ratio change slightly
among different groups.
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Figure 6.6. Distribution of businesses based on review number
The impact of business density is shown in Fig.6.8. We first group the unit regions
according to the number of their businesses, and the counting result is shown in Fig.6.8(a).
Based on the result shown in Fig.6.8(b), we see that the unit regions with higher density
have a better success ratio. The reason is that these regions can receive a larger budget
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Figure 6.7. Performance among different group of businesses
under our budget allocation mechanism. The unit regions with lower density are visited by
users less frequently, so each existing visit/review is more sensitive. This in turn causes a
tight budget and then relatively bad utility for the involved businesses.
1 1
7
2
5
o t h e r s < 2 0 0 < 1 0 0 < 5 00
2
4
6
8
1 0
 nu
mb
er o
f  u
nit r
egio
n
 
 
n u m b e r  o f   b u s i n e s s
(a) Distribution of businesses based on unit
region density
0 . 5 3 0 2 50 . 5 9 4
0 . 6 8 5 5 3
0 . 8 7 7 4 5
o t h e r s < 2 0 0 < 1 0 0 < 5 00 . 0
0 . 2
0 . 4
0 . 6
0 . 8
 suc
ces
s ra
tio
 
 
n u m b e r  o f  b u s i n e s s
(b) successful businesses ratio
Figure 6.8. Performance on different business density.
6.6 Summary
Location privacy is an essential issue due to its vulnerabilities for both cyber and phys-
ical attacks. Furthermore, different LBS systems often face multiple types of challenges.
This chapter investigates review publishing in crowdsourced local service systems, where the
location information is tied with the local businesses. It defines system utility and loca-
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tion privacy of users in a new way. We propose a novel framework to determine the public
and anonymous status for all reviews. The framework involves two algorithms, and it can
maintain good review lists for both businesses and users while not breaking any privacy
constraint. The extensive experiments on real-world dataset validate the performance of our
framework comprehensively.
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Chapter 7
PRIVACY-PRESERVED DATA PUBLICATION FOR COMMUNITY
STRUCTURE DISCOVERY
7.1 Motivation
Users in online social networks (OSNs for short) formulate a latent community structure,
where individuals are grouped into communities according to their behaviors. Generally, in-
dividuals within the same community are more likely to share direct social links, common
friends, and similar profiles. Therefore, a third-party server like the application developer
intends to discover the underlying community structure, which can be further utilized to
facilitate some important services like individual behavior analysis [170], user-specific rec-
ommendation, group transmission [171], and rumor control [136]. However, to discover the
accurate community structure requests a fine access to the link-level information in a social
network, which can seriously breach user privacy. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the
design of the framework for community detection with privacy preservation.
Although there has been a series of study providing multiple approaches [114] for com-
munity detection, one common feature for most of these works is that they are based on
the access to social links among users, e.g., the widely accepted stochastic block model
[120]. This access actually leads to a serious exposure of sensitive information, since social
links usually refer to sensitive social contacts, personal opinions, and private communication
records among users. Therefore, a third-party server in practice usually has access to only
partial information due to the fact that the data owner of social networks actively preserve
the private information for users.
As for the privacy-preserved access to the content in social networks, there is also a
batch of mechanisms to help a third-party server access the information without yielding the
sensitive information [172] [173]. Among all of these techniques, differential privacy [17] is
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believed to be most effective against adversaries with strong background knowledge. Gen-
erally, the existing works supporting differential-private access of servers can be categorized
into two classes. The first class of mechanisms publish an obfuscated social network with
a guarantee on the differential privacy, and a third-party server is allowed to do arbitrary
processing on the obfuscated network. The second class of mechanisms work interactively,
where a third-party server can send a set of queries or data mining tasks to the data owner
to retrieve privacy-preserved answers or results. Then the third-party server can use the
outputs to discover necessary information.
Unfortunately, neither of the two classes can carry out community detection. The first
class of works mostly focus on the retaining of the node degree distribution, the length of
the shortest path, or some general principles [104], while the community structure is still
unsettled. One main reason is that the community structure is usually built on the knowledge
of every specific link. The preservation of this information is beyond the scope of differential
privacy, which is usually achieved by perturbing the statistical results. Meanwhile, the
second class of methods also fail to detect the community structure for the similar reason.
This chapter handles all the challenges and proposes a novel framework for differential
private community detection. The framework can support a third-party server to derive use-
ful community structure, while preserving the existence of sensitive links. More specifically,
our framework provides an interactive procedure where a third-party server dynamically re-
quests the weights of social links to refine current community structure, instead of directly
asking the existence of the links. The data owner can return the obfuscated link weights
so as to preserve the existence of each link. Furthermore, in our framework, a third-party
server can also combine public social links and the published contents by each user to fur-
ther regulate the community structure. In this chapter, we consider the mobility patterns
as the published contents, which indicates the likelihood a user appears in some local area.
Compared with the study on releasing a whole social network, our framework also supports a
flexible community detection, where a third-party server can adjustably gain more accurate
community information for some concerned subnetworks. Our framework is also applicable
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for different definitions of community structures, e.g., whether communities overlap or not.
As far as we know, this is the first study to propose a framework for community detection
considering both social links among users and published contents, while providing differential
privacy preservation on sensitive social links. Our main contributions include:
• Formulating the community detection problem for online social networks considering
preserving sensitive links.
• Regarding differential privacy as the metric for privacy preservation.
• Proposing an extended weighted stochastic block model to capture both social links
and published contents.
• Designing a heuristic algorithm for third-party servers, which can be used to discover
a highly accurate community structure, while preserving sensitive links.
• Validating the performance of the proposed framework extensively towards a real world
dataset.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II introduces our system
model and some preliminary knowledge. Section III presents the overview of our framework.
Section IV illustrates the weighted stochastic block model capturing both social links and user
profiles. Section V introduces the heuristic algorithm for interactively gaining information
from the data owner to refine the discovered community structure. Section VI shows the
evaluation results towards the real world dataset, and Section VII concludes the chapter.
7.2 Problem Formulation
We formulate the online social network as G = {V,E}, where V = {u1, u2, · · · , u|V |}
is the set of users, and E ⊂ V · V denotes the undirected social relationships among users.
The adjacency matrix M|V ||V | = eij represents social connections/links or friendships in G,
where eij = 1 when users ui and uj are direct friend, and eij = 0 otherwise. eij is also
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denoted as the social relationship between ui and uj no matter eij = 1 or not. Among these
connections, there is a set of public links Ep, and other links Es = E/Ep are set private by
the users, which are not willing to be accessed by third-party servers.
Each user ui has a corresponding profile denoted as Ai, which is also an essential compo-
nent for online social networks besides the social connections. Such a profile can be derived
from the published contents of the user, which may refer to patterns like preferred categories
of movies, interested research topics, etc. In this work, we consider the mobility pattern for
a user [174]. To be more specific, this work partitions a whole area into N grids, and the
profile as well as the pattern Ai = {ai1, ai2, · · · , aiN}, where aij denotes the probability that
ui stays in jth grid, and
∑N
j=1 aij = 1. The profiles can also include other general attributes
like genders and ages by introducing an extra dimension.
Assume there are totally K communities in a social network, denoted as C1, C2, · · · , CK .
Users belonging to the same community generally have similar profiles and common friends.
Each user has a belonging vector Gi = {gi1, gi2, · · · , giK}, where 0 ≤ gij ≤ 1 denotes the
likelihood that ui is a member in community Cj. This work assumes each user belongs to
only one community, indicating that
∑K
j=1 gij = 1.
In this work, we preserve the existence of each private link, which means a third-party
server will get no extra information about links in Ep during the procedure of community
detection. To address this issue, a typical differential privacy model [17] is introduced.
The differential privacy has emerged as a pervasively utilized framework to quantify the
notion of ”indistinguishability” of neighboring graphs. Two social networks G = {V,E}
and G′ = {V ′, E ′} are said to be neighbors of each other when V = V ′, E ⊂ E ′, and
|E|+ 1 = |E ′|. Formally, the -differential privacy of a social network is defined as follow:
Definition 6. A randomized algorithm F is -differential privacy if for any two neighboring
social networks G and G′, and for any output Ω ∈ Range(F ),
Pr[F (G) ∈ Ω] ≤ e · Pr[F (G′) ∈ Ω] (7.1)
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We utilize the edge differential privacy in this work since the objective is to preserve
the existence of sensitive social links. Parameter  is also known as the budget provided for
a third-party server. Users in OSNs may adjust the budgets to indicate their preference on
the link privacy. A larger  means the request on privacy preservation is relatively looser, so
that a third-party server can gain more accurate knowledge from the social network.
Differential privacy is usually achieved by the Laplace mechanism [17] when the function
f(·) returns numerical results. This mechanism is based on the concept of global sensitivity
of the function f(·) defined on Gs. For any two neighboring social networks G and G′, the
global sensitivity of f(·) is defined as ∆f = maxG,G′ ||f(G)− f(G′)||1.
Given budget , the differential privacy on function f(·) is achieved by introducing noise
to the output of f(·), and the scale of noise is determined by the Laplace distribution with
the probability density function p(x|λ) = 1
2λ
e−|x|/λ, where λ = ∆f/. We have the following
conclusion [17]:
Theorem 6. For any function f(·) : G → R, the randomized algorithm F provides -
differential privacy when
F (G) = f(G) + Lap(
∆f

),
where Lap(∆f

) is a Laplace variable with scaling factor ∆f

.
The following theorems provide the principles of sequential and parallel composition for
differential privacy, which are used for our analysis.
Theorem 7 (SEQUENTIAL COMPOSITION [28]). Let Fi’s be a set of algorithms, each
providing i-differential privacy, then running all the algorithms in sequence can provide∑
i-differential privacy.
Theorem 8 (PARALLEL COMPOSITION [28]). If Gi’s are disjoint subsets of the original
social graph G, and Fi’s are a set of algorithms each providing i-differential privacy. Then
applying all Fi’s to their corresponding subset Gi can guarantee a max{i}-differential privacy
for the whole social graph.
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The utility for a third-party server is defined as the distance between the detected
community belonging vectors and the ground truth. The third-party servers may utilize
a more accurate community structure to implement further services in OSNs. This work
assumes the ground truth to be the belonging vectors detected when a third-party server
has full access to all the information of a social network. Then the corresponding accuracy
is evaluated as below.
Accuracy = 1− 1/2
∑|V |
i=1
∑K
j=1 |gij − g0ij|
|V | (7.2)
where G0i = {g0i1, g0i2, · · · , g0iK} denotes the ground truth belonging vector for user ui. A
larger accuracy refers to a better utility since a third-party server can observe a more reliable
community structure.
As a consequence, the objective of a third party server is to minimize the distance (in
Formula (3)) between the observed (in Formula (4)) and the ground truth (in Formula (5))
belonging vectors, while following the -differential privacy principle (in Formula (6)) with
the data owner.
min
|V |∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
|gij − g0ij| (7.3)
s.t.
K∑
i=1
gij = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |V |} (7.4)
K∑
i=1
g0ij = 1 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |V |} (7.5)∑
Qt
t ≤  ∀eij, (7.6)
where Qt’s is a set of queries each guaranteeing differential privacy, and t denotes the budget
assigned for Qt.
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7.3 Framework Overview
To facilitate differential privacy on social networks, a third-party server has no access
to the accurate existence of every single link. In this framework, the data owner keeps
and processes the data for users [175]. They also collect the sensitive links and preference
on the privacy for these links. Then third-party servers can only extract differential private
information from the data owner. Such a limitation makes the typical edge-based community
detection methods infeasible. Therefore, this work proposes a novel framework for third-
party servers, which relies on an alternative metric: the weight on each link, to derive
community structure of an online social network. The framework generally includes three
main phases.
In the first phase, the framework extracts the weight information on social links, and
feeds the weights to the second phase. During the initialization, this phase estimates the
weights on all the public social connections, which are derived from both the distance between
the profiles and the social closeness of the two users. During the subsequent iterations, this
phase simply passes the newly retrieved weights to the second phase.
In the second phase, the framework utilizes both the initially estimated weights and re-
trieved weights in the pervious iteration to detect the underlying community structure. The
weighted stochastic block model is used to formulate the correlation between underlying
community belongings and the social behaviors, including the profiles and social relation-
ships. To be specific, it introduces a set of parameters G, S, and D, where G denotes the
belonging vectors for users, S and D denote the distribution of social closeness and profile
distance between users from two communities separately. A variational Bayes approach [119]
is utilized to derive parameters G, S, and D that can maximize the likelihood in generating
the currently known weights.
In the third phase, the framework estimates the weights for the remaining links based
on the parameters derived in the second phase. It selects a set of links and sends together
their estimated weights to the data owner. The data owner returns the obfuscated weights
on these links at least as accurate as the estimated ones. The framework then steps back
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to the first phase and starts the next iteration. The retrieved weights will be fed to the
weighted stochastic block model in the first step.
The whole procedure terminates when the framework has no privacy budget to retrieve
the weight of any link. The whole framework is shown in Fig.7.1.
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Figure 7.1. Overview of The Community Detection Framework.
7.4 The Combinatorial Weight Stochastic Block Model
The Stochastic Block Model (SBM) [120] is one of the most popular methods for com-
munity detection in online social networks. It is mainly based on the intuition that users
belonging to the same community share similar behaviors: they usually have similar profiles,
more common friends, and are more likely to have social connections with each other. In
this work, we utilize an extended SBM, i.e., combinatorial Weighted Stochastic Block
Model (WSBM) [119], which considers the social links among users as weighted connections
instead of the exact existence or nonexistence.
Assume there are totally K communities. WSBM assigns a community belonging vector
Gi = {gi1, gi2, · · · , giK} for each user ui, which defines the likelihood that ui is a member
of each community. For each pair of communities Ci and Cj, i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}, WSBM
assigns Sij and Dij, which separately refer to the distribution functions on the social closeness
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and profiles distance between users from the two communities. In this work, we define both
Sij and Dij as normal distributions, with parameters uSij , δSij , and uDij , δDij .
We quantize the profile distance between two users as follows. For users ui and uj,
wpij =
1− 1
2
∑N
k=1 |aik − ajk| − wpmin
wpmax − wpmin
. (7.7)
wpij is also denoted as the profile weight between ui and uj, where w
p
max = maxi,j(1 −
1
2
∑N
k=1 |aik− ajk|), and wpmin = mini,j(1− 12
∑N
k=1 |aik− ajk|). Two users have a large weight
on the profile distance when they share similar profiles.
We also introduce two other weights, friendship weight wfij and social weight w
s
ij, which
are defined as follows.
wfij = eij, (7.8)
wsij =
2
∑|V |
K=1 eikejk∑|V |
K=1 eik+
∑|V |
K=1 ejk
− wsmin
wsmax − wsmin
, (7.9)
where wsmax = maxi,j
2
∑|V |
K=1 eikejk∑|V |
K=1 eik+
∑|V |
K=1 ejk
, and wsmin = mini,j
2
∑|V |
K=1 eikejk∑|V |
K=1 eik+
∑|V |
K=1 ejk
. wfij indicates
whether the two users are directly connected, and wsij denotes the ratio of their common
friends.
Generally, the weight between two users ui and uj is denoted as
wij = αw
p
ij + βw
f
ij + γw
s
ij, (7.10)
where larger weight indicates two users may be friends, share similar profiles, and have many
common friends. According to Formula (10), we formulate the social relationships among
users as a combination of profiles, direct friendship, and common friends. In this way, we
can also formulate the online social network as a weighted graph, where users are vertices in
the graph, and the relationships are represented as the weighted edges among them. Finally,
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the influence of a user is also denoted by the weights, where users have a larger influence in
their communities, and smaller influence outside their communities.
Now given an assignment on G = {gij}, S = {Sij}, and D = {Dij}, the likelihood that
the community structure can generate the social network is
Pr(G(V,E)|G,S,D) =
∏
eij=1
K∑
m=1
K∑
n=1
gimgjnSmn(βw
f
ij + γw
s
ij)Dmn(αw
p
ij). (7.11)
Therefore, one task of the framework is to derive the parameters G, S, and D maxi-
mizing the likelihood of generating the social networks with currently known weights. In
our framework, we utilize the efficient variational Bayes approach proposed in [119], and the
three parameters can be either correlated or independent. One should notice that during
each iteration, our framework only considers the weights on public links and the weights
retrieved in the previous iterations, during generating the parameters G, S, and D.
7.5 Heuristic Link Weight Requesting Algorithm
This section introduces the algorithm used by the third phase of the proposed frame-
work, which further refines the community structure under the provided budget on privacy.
The first part introduces the basic idea and some notations used by the algorithm. The
second part introduces the detailed procedure of the algorithm. The third part analyzes the
performance of the algorithm.
7.5.1 Basic Idea
The objective of the third phase is to retrieve extra information of a social network,
to improve the accuracy of the observed community structure. To achieve this, this work
proposes a heuristic algorithm called Exclusive Maximum Divergence First (EMDF) link
selection algorithm. The input of EMDF is a set of estimated weights for all the private
yet not considered links. EMDF iteratively selects qualified links and requests their weights
from the data owner together with an assigned privacy budget for each link.
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Generally, the importance of the weight on each link is defined as the divergence
between its profile weight and two other estimated weights, defined as
Divij = |αwpij − βwfij − γwsij|, (7.12)
where a large divergence means the two users have a significant inconsistency on the profiles
and the social relationships. This contradicts with the hypothesis that users with similar
profiles also have a close relationship. This conclusion indicates that SBM and the derived
parameters could be biased and need to be regulated. Therefore, EMDF intuitively requests
the true weights on links with larger divergence, and the framework can use the retrieved
results to refine WSBM.
The second consideration of EMDF is to determine the budget spent on each requested
link. Usually, a larger budget refers to a higher accuracy on the answer from the data owner.
Therefore, EMDF fixes a maximum number of query links including an arbitrary user as an
end point, denoted as Tmax, to make each request assigned with a relatively large budget.
Finally, considering that the retrieved link weights will be used to refine WSBM, which
may also eliminate some currently divergent links, EMDF also discards some links from the
current iteration if they are highly correlated with the selected links. Assume the weight
on link eij is selected, then all the other links eik’s (or ejk’s) are discarded in the current
iteration if wjk > δ0 (or wik > δ0). We denote δ0 as the discarding condition .
7.5.2 Algorithm
The detailed procedure of the algorithm is as follows.
In the third phase of the lth iteration for the framework, EMDF first maintains for
each user ui the list of social links sorted in descending order of their divergence. More
specifically, EMDF tracks the top-(Tmax − |Qi|) links, where Qi refers to the set of links
that connects ui as an end point and are selected in the previous iterations. When some
links in the top-(Tmax− |Qi|) list has an alternative end point uj whose |Qj| = Tmax, EMDF
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permanently discards these links and adds the following links into the top-(Tmax − |Qi|) list
for ui.
In the second step, EMDF considers all the lists simultaneously and selects the link
with the globally maximum divergence. Assume the link is ei′j′ . This link is included in the
query list Ql. Next, EMDF scans all the links in the top-(Tmax − |Qi|) list for every user ui,
and discards temporarily all the links ei′i and ej′i with wij′ > δ0 and wii′ > δ0. Then EMDF
starts over and searches for the link with the second largest divergence. This step terminates
when either all top-(Tmax− |Qi|) lists are empty, or selecting any link will cause some nodes
to exceed the maximum number Tmax.
As a third step, EMDF sends the query link list Ql and the estimated weights on these
links to the data owner. The privacy budget for each query link is 
2Tmax
. For the data
owner, it first estimates the true weight for each link according to equation (7.10). Then
the data owner simply returns the uploaded estimated weight from the third-party server if
it is within the 95% confidential interval of the true weight by introducing a Laplace noise
with λ = 2Tmax·max{β,γ}

. Otherwise, the data owner returns the true weight obfuscated by
introducing a noise of Lap(2Tmax·max{β,γ}

).
Finally, the returned weights on the query links are the output of EMDF. We now intro-
duce the condition for the termination of the whole framework here. The whole framework
terminates when EMDF can add no links into the top-(Tmax−|Qi|) lists, which means there
is at most one node whose number of query links has not exceeded Tmax.
7.5.3 Performance Analysis
We first estimate the time complexity of EMDF. For the first step of EMDF, it takes
O(|V |3) in the worst case. However, considering that the algorithm only tracks the first
Tmax − |Qi| links, the desired time complexity is O(Tmax|V |2). For the second step, EMDF
scans all the links in the top-Tmax−|Qi| list to select the optimal link, which takesO(Tmax|V |).
Then it takes another O(Tmax|V |) to discard the correlated links. Therefore, the time
complexity for the second step is O(2Tmax|V |). The time complexity for the third step
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is O(Tmax|V |2), where calculating the true weight for each link takes O(|V |). Generally, the
expected time complexity of the heuristic algorithm is O(|V |2), which is polynomial with the
scale of users in the online social network.
Next, we demonstrate the performance of EMDF on privacy preservation. This is a
critical property as the object of our framework is to provide the privacy preservation during
the community detection by third-party servers. We first show that EMDF can provide

2Tmax
-differential privacy for each involved link when the data owner returns the weight for
each query link.
Assume the query link is eij, then according to Equations (7.8) and (7.9), all eik’s and
ejk’s are involved in the calculation. Firstly, when the third-party server receives the same
result as the locally estimated weight, it can only notice that the value is within the 95%
confidential interval of the Laplace distribution. This scenario leaks little information on
the involved links. Secondly, when the third-party server receives the obfuscated weights,
the scale of noise is 2Tmax·max{β,γ}

. The following lemma gives the global sensitivity of the
function to calculate the weight.
Lemma 3. The global sensitivity ∆f for calculating the weights between two social users is
max{β, γ}, where f(ui, uj) = wij = αwpij + βwfij + γwsij.
Proof. According to Equation (7.8), the global sensitivity of wpij is 1, i.e., the difference
between the social graphs with eij = 0 and eij = 1. According to Equation (7.9), the global
sensitivity of wsij is also one, e.g., the case where ui has a single friend uk, and uj has no
friends or single friend uk. Both types of global sensitivities are correct since 0 ≤ wfij ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ wsij ≤ 1.
Meanwhile, two weights are determined by different links, which means the global sen-
sitivity ∆f is the larger one between these two weights, i.e., max{β, γ}.
Based on Lemma 3, we can tell EMDF can provide 
2Tmax
-differential privacy in the
second case. Therefore, EMDF can generally provide 
2Tmax
-differential privacy for each
involved link during each query.
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Now considering each single link eij, we can observe from Equations (7.8) and (7.9) that
the existence of eij contributes to the calculation of the weight only when either ui or uj
appears as an end point in the query link. Then we can preserve the -differential privacy for
eij when we carefully preserve the differential privacy for each query link involving eij. This
condition is in fact achieved by EMDF. Firstly, according to Lemma 3 and the subsequent
analysis, the data owner guarantees 
2Tmax
-differential privacy for each query link. Meanwhile,
EMDF limits the number of query links involving each user to be less than Tmax. Together
with Theorem 7, EMDF provides -differential privacy. Finally, since queries cover different
parts of a graph when their links share no common end users, we have the following conclusion
based on Theorem.8.
Theorem 9. EMDF achieves -differential privacy for social network G(V,E).
Therefore, our framework can properly guarantee the differential privacy for the com-
munity detection. We now briefly address the flexibility of the proposed heuristic algorithm.
EMDF heuristically selects the links with the largest divergence, since their weights are ab-
normal, and knowing more accurate values of these weights can regulate or validate commu-
nity structure. However, EMDF has no control on selecting specific users, while third-party
servers are more interested in subgroups of a social network. These servers care less about
the social behaviors outside the subgroups. In this case, a server can make a small modifica-
tion on EMDF to support the flexible selection. It can cut a graph by simply dropping some
users, which will lead to no knowledge on the community outside of the interested group.
An alternative solution is to relax the discarding condition in the second step of EMDF, or
modify the condition to a condition function based on whether the link belongs to the inter-
ested group. In this solution, a third-party can even utilize the weight information between
the subgroups and the remaining graph to update the community structure in the concerned
part.
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7.6 Evaluation
7.6.1 Settings
In this work, we evaluate the performance of the proposed framework via the public
dataset released by Yelp [140] for academic purposes. Yelp! is an online local business
service system where users can publish reviews for local businesses and announce social links
with each other. The public dataset includes reviews published by users for local businesses,
the social connections among users, and some other basic information like locations for
businesses. Furthermore, the user id in the dataset is anonymized to conceal the undesired
leakage. More specifically, we focus on the users in Edinburgh, EDH. The number of users
is 3,098, and there are totally 22,957 reviews. We partition the city into 5*5 grids. The
mobility pattern of a user is a vector denoting the proportion of reviews for businesses in
each grid.
The users are grouped into 5 disjoint communities. The ground truth is derived by
running the framework with full access to the social graph, i.e., all the reviews and social
links are public, In another word, we process the standard WSBM on this dataset, and take
the output as the ground truth. We compare our algorithm with the randomized algorithm,
which randomly selects links and sends to the data owner to retrieve weights. We also
consider a modified EMDF algorithm, denoted as MDF, where the discarding of correlated
links in Step 2 is skipped. Finally, the performance of all the algorithms is evaluated by the
accuracy of the observed community structure: Accuracy = 1 − 1/2
∑|V |
i=1
∑K
j=1 |gij−g0ij |
|V | , where
g0ij refers to the ground truth. The ratio of public information refers to the ratio of the links
that are set public. We set α = 1/2, β = 1/4, and γ = 1/4, where the weights for social
links and published contents are treated identically. The settings for other parameters in the
algorithm are introduced in the following subsections respectively.
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7.6.2 Accuracy on Community Structure
We first evaluate the performance of EMDF with various budget  and under various
ratios of public information. Generally, the data owner may provide different degrees of
differential privacy for users, which indicates different  in Formula (6). Users may also have
various preferences on sensitive links, which leads to different overall ratios of public links
in a network. Larger  and overall ratio refer to less concentration on the sensitivity of the
social links. Our objective is to validate the performance of our framework with different
settings on budget and public ratio. Other parameters are δ0 = 0.7 and Tmax = 10.
As shown in Fig.7.2, EMDF outperforms the randomized algorithm. It can achieve an
averagely 40% better accuracy than the baseline random algorithm. Meanwhile, we find
that MDF also outperforms the baseline algorithm, which is about 20% more accurate in
general. It indicates that the basic idea of selecting the links with larger divergence benefits
community detection.
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Figure 7.2. Accuracy with different privacy budget .
Secondly, we find that high accuracy is achieved when the budget is relatively large
(≥60). This is due to the fact that the weight ranges from 0 to 1, while the introduced
Laplace noise ranges in a relatively large scale when the budget is small. Therefore, our
framework requests the budget to be sufficiently large to make the obfuscated weights useful
in refining community structure. We can also see that as the ratio of public links increases,
the performance of EMDF is good even if the budget is small. It indicates that our framework
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can accurately estimate the weights for most links when the public information is sufficient,
and EMDF can retain these estimated weights during interactions with the data owner.
Fig.7.3 reveals the performance of EMDF with various ratios of public links. As shown in
Fig.7.3(a), all the three algorithms have low accuracy when the budget is small. In this case,
the accuracy is dominated by the ratio of public information. It indicates that the introduced
noise is relatively large when the budget is small, so that the retrieved results cannot be used
to refine WSBM. However, we can see from Fig.7.3(b) and Fig.7.3(c) that as the budget
and the public ratio increase, our algorithm can effectively utilize the retrieved weights to
regulate the parameters in WSBM. Both experiments demonstrate that our framework can
be applied by third-party servers to derive meaningful community structure under the privacy
constraint.
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Figure 7.3. Accuracy with different public ratio of links.
7.6.3 Performance with Various Parameters
In this part, we investigate the performance of EMDF with different choices of Tmax
and δ0. Both parameters are important for the servers to effectively derive the qualified
community structure. We set budget  to be 80.
Parameter Tmax indicates the strategy in assigning budget for each query link. When
Tmax is relatively large, the framework aggressively selects more links and assigns less budget
per link. Fig.7.4 shows the results with different Tmax’s. According to Fig.7.4(a), EMDF
should make a trade-off between the number of query links and the budget spent on each
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link. A relatively good trade-off is Tmax = 15. Otherwise, the queried links are too sparse
to support the framework in achieving a high accuracy when Tmax = 10, or the retrieved
weights are too noisy when Tmax = 20/25. According to Fig.7.4(b) and Fig.7.4(c), as the
ratio of public information keeps increasing, our framework can provide a relatively accurate
estimation for weights. Therefore, to achieve a better performance requests more budgets
spent on each query link to retrieve more accurate results. As a result, the performance can
hardly be improved when Tmax = 15/20/25 in Fig.7.4(b) and Fig.7.4(c) since the introduced
noise is large.
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Figure 7.4. Accuracy with various max query links Tmax.
Finally, Fig.7.5 illustrates the performance of EMDF with various δ0. Parameter δ0
indicate the strategy of discarding similar links during the query link selection. EMDF
discards links more aggressively when δ0 is small. As can be seen from Fig.7.5(a) and
Fig.7.5(b), a larger δ0 is preferred when the public ratio is small. In this case, the weights
of these links are requested to improve the tightness of the community since the public
information is insufficient. However, as the amount of available information increases, the
weights can be estimated more accurately. Then the selection of δ0 becomes less important,
which is shown in Fig.7.5(c). Generally, third-party servers should properly determine two
parameters according to the underlying OSN for community detection.
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Figure 7.5. Accuracy with various discarding condition δ0.
7.7 Summary
This chapter addresses the problem of community detection in online social networks
with privacy preservation on sensitive links, which mitigates the gap between the implemen-
tation of this important task and users’ privacy concern. A novel framework is introduced,
which can be utilized by a third-party server to derive community structure of a given social
network, while providing an -differential privacy for the network. Our future work considers
the community detection on social networks where both social links and profiles could be
sensitive.
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Chapter 8
FUTURE WORK
8.1 Future Work 1: Privacy Preservation on Correlated Data
The first part of our future topics studies the publication of data from multiple correlated
dimensions. The fast developing of sensing techniques and embedding techniques, as well
as the widely-adopted devices for multimedia data collection, current citizens in urban area
are like to be monitored by a batch of devices simultaneously. These devices will obviously
contribute quite diverse data to the system. For example, in a smart building system, the
behaviors of a resident will be captured by her cellphone, the access points nearby, cameras,
sensors, Bluetooth devices, and many others like access control systems and parking systems.
While bringing impressive convenience, the data could also severely threat the resident due to
their spatial-temporal-contextual correlations and comprehensiveness. Third-party service
providers with full access to the data may achieve full tracking of the resident, which is a
terrible breach for the private information.
As a result, our first topic will design corresponding mechanisms for data publication
considering the linkage among multiple data sources. We plan to take the data collected
in smart building systems as an instance, which is a typical IoT system involving diverse
devices and consistently monitoring a stable group of residents.
Our first task is to thoroughly investigate how the data can track the residents in a
spatial-temporal-contextual domain, and the concerned information includes the locations
of the resident and her motions. Based on the investigation, we will derive the linkage
among data in two aspects: the duplication and the coverage. The duplication refers to
the linkage among data that can observe the same activities of the resident. The coverage
indicates the combination of data that can fully track the behaviors in given spatial-temporal
windows. We will utilize some training models for sensory data and multimedia data to
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extract the underlying activities. Corresponding algorithms will also be proposed to improve
the accuracy of the inference on other data sources, and derive the proper data structure
storing the linkage.
Our second task is to design a series of data publication mechanisms for multiple linkable
data sources. These mechanisms will separately focus on their own definitions of utilities
and privacy. For example, we will design a corresponding mechanism for the scenario where
published data will be used to improve the light control in the building with sparse devices
deployed, while the service providers will not gain knowledge on the exact number of resi-
dents in each area. We will also provide solutions for data publication used for customized
services, and other privacy issues like the disclosure of single sensitive activity or sensitive
sophisticated patterns. The core idea in our study is to properly handle the linkage among
data and its correlations with both the utility and privacy aspects.
Finally, we will also study the problems where the data from single source owns knowl-
edge in multiple dimensions. For example, residents may actively report the events happened
in the building. Then the uploaded contents include both the description of the event and
the physical status of residents, which are knowledge in two dimensions. In this case, the
published contents should capture the events with sufficient confidence, while the sensitive
status should also be concealed. We will design corresponding data publication mechanisms
for these scenarios.
8.2 Future Work 2: Community Privacy and Utility
The second part of our future work is to properly preserve the privacy and utility for the
population during data publication. As is shown in our previous study, the inherent social
and physical connections among individuals also contribute to the emergence of the linkage in
social-physical data. Firstly, people belonging to the same community will obviously generate
correlated social-physical data as they may work or live in the same building, and travel or
entertain together. The linkage could even be enhanced when the data are jointly considered
with the data published by community members on online social networks. Secondly, even a
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group of strangers happen to be in the same place could be captured by the sensing devices
deployed nearby. In this case, the data are also linkable towards these people as they form
a temporary related crowd.
This kind of linkage will no wonder lead to severe threats to both the population and
individuals inside. In the first fold, people inside the community may leak their private
information even if they properly select their published contents. The underlying reason is
that they are closely related to others in the community, whose contents could also reveal
the same private information once published carelessly. In the second fold, the community
itself may also include some sensitive information. For example, the people in the alcoholic
anonymous may leak the purpose of their community when third-party could combine the
contents around them, even if the contents from each person are seemingly innocent. Fur-
thermore, the sensitive information for a group of unrelated people could also be revealed
due to the linkable social-physical data. For example, the moving trends of crowds could be
utilized by malicious attackers for terrorist attacks, or the common preference and activities
of the crowds could be used by advertisers for spamming.
Due to the above facts, we further investigate the privacy-preserved linkable social-
physical data publication considering common utility and privacy among population.
Firstly, we will thoroughly investigate the data publication for a community of related
people. In this task, community members may publish the contents for individual purpose,
while their privacy are correlated on the contents. Then the objective of the data publication
mechanism is to properly handle the utility for members, as well as concealing the disclosure
of sensitive information. We will extract the linkage among contents from different members,
and utilize the game theory to ensure that the published contents guarantee the equilibrium
for community members. We will also consider the scenario where community members share
identical purpose and common privacy issues. In this case, the published contents should
make a proper trade-off between the data utility and the compromise common privacy. The
resource consumption will also be considered to balance the cost for data publication.
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Secondly, we will also study the publication of social-physical data for an unrelated
crowd. As we see, the social-physical data may reveal some abnormal trends and activities
of locally close people. Our focus in this task is to retain the normal process of the system
via the published data, while the third-party will not gain detailed knowledge of the crowd.
More specifically, we will first derive the correlation between the social-physical data and
the crowd motions via some trained model and statistical analysis. Based on the knowledge,
we will design data publication mechanisms that can properly conceal the common critical
knowledge of the crowd, while still guaranteeing the normally functioning of the system.
Some problem formulations will be given, and corresponding algorithms for linkable social-
physical data publication will be proposed and validated via real-world data trace.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we study the problems of linkable social-physical data publication
considering the privacy preservation. As the linkage pervasively exists in all aspects ranging
from the application level, individual level, and population level, this dissertation proposes
a series of solutions handling the newly emerged privacy issues for data publication.
Firstly, this dissertation designs a new data publication algorithm for cyber-physical
social systems. In these systems, the data contains both physical and social features. The
proposed algorithm can simultaneously preserve the sensitive physical profile and retain the
useful social profile. It can be used as a guideline for numerous data publication problems
correlated with profiles in multiple dimensions in Cyber-Physical Social Systems.
Secondly, the dissertation designs a novel mechanism for content uploading in crowd-
sensing systems. The linked data utility, user privacy, and resource consumption are jointly
considered and properly balanced. The proposed mechanism works as an approach to deal
with the novel challenges for privacy preservation in application level.
Thirdly, the dissertation proposes a corresponding algorithm for data publication in
cyber-physical social networks. The published contents will be utilized for individual rec-
ommendation. The proposed algorithm guarantees the recommended results for a large size
of users, while preserving the individual privacy and fairness. The algorithm can be used
as a solution for the newly emerged privacy issues in individual level due to the linkable
social-physical data.
Fourthly, the dissertation studies the problem where the published data are used for
common utility in local business service systems. A novel mechanism is proposed for data
publication in this scenario, which conceals the frequently visited place for participants.
The mechanism also achieves a joint consideration for contents from all users, aiming at
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maintaining a trustable reputation for local businesses. The proposed mechanism provides a
guideline for the scenarios where the population publish their data for one common purpose.
Fifthly, the dissertation focuses on the problem of community detection in which some
social links are sensitive. Specifically, the population intend to preserve their common pri-
vacy, i.e., the sensitive links, and expect their published data could still be meaningful for
further services. As a result, the proposed mechanism can help third-party service providers
derive useful information for refining the observed community structure, while not breaching
the knowledge on sensitive links.
All the proposed solutions are thoroughly discussed and validated through extensive
evaluations. Meanwhile, we also discuss some topics for future study in our dissertation.
Generally, our dissertation provides a body of solutions for social-physical data publication.
These solutions could comprehensively cover the novel challenges for privacy preservation
caused by the linkage in the data. We believe the study in this dissertation will work as a
strong reference for the tasks of privacy-preserved data publication. Finally, this dissertation
will also be an inspiration to stimulate the subsequent efforts towards the publication of
linkable social-physical data.
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